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THE GENERATIVE INTERNET 
Jonathan L. Zittrain
∗ 
The generative capacity for unrelated and unaccredited audiences to build and distribute 
code and content through the Internet to its tens of millions of attached personal computers 
has ignited growth and innovation in information technology and has facilitated new 
creative endeavors.  It has also given rise to regulatory and entrepreneurial backlashes.  A 
further backlash among consumers is developing in response to security threats that exploit 
the openness of the Internet and of PCs to third-party contribution.  A shift in consumer 
priorities from generativity to stability will compel undesirable responses from regulators and 
markets and, if unaddressed, could prove decisive in closing today’s open computing 
environments.  This Article explains why PC openness is as important as network openness, 
as well as why today’s open network might give rise to unduly closed endpoints.  It argues 
that the Internet is better conceptualized as a generative grid that includes both PCs and 
networks rather than as an open network indifferent to the configuration of its endpoints.  
Applying this framework, the Article explores ways — some of them bound to be unpopular 
among advocates of an open Internet represented by uncompromising end-to-end neutrality 
— in which the Internet can be made to satisfy genuine and pressing security concerns while 
retaining the most important generative aspects of today’s networked technology. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
rom the moment of its inception in 1969,1 the Internet has been 
designed to serve both as a means of establishing a logical network 
and as a means of subsuming existing heterogeneous networks while 
allowing those networks to function independently — that is, both as a 
set of building blocks and as the glue holding the blocks together.2  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  ∗  Professor of Internet Governance and Regulation, Oxford University; Jack N. & Lillian R. 
Berkman Visiting Professor of Entrepreneurial Legal Studies, Harvard Law School. I received 
helpful insights on earlier drafts from Ben Adida, David Barron, Stefan Bechtold, Yochai Benkler, 
John Bracken, Tom Brown, David Clark, Julie Cohen, Einer Elhauge, Joan Feigenbaum, William 
Fisher, Charles Fried, Rainer Gawlick, Jack Goldsmith, David Isenberg, David Johnson, Law-
rence Lessig, Betsy Masiello, Daniel Meltzer, Frank Michelman, Martha Minow, Thomas 
Nachbar, Charles Nesson, Andy Oram, John Palfrey, Randy Picker, David Post, Ira Rubinstein, 
Pamela Samuelson, William Stuntz, K.A. Taipale, and participants in the Georgetown Law Fac-
ulty Workshop Series, the Penn/Temple/Wharton Colloquium, the Berkman/Berkeley Colloquium, 
and the Harvard Law School summer research program.  I thank Erin Ashwell, Bryan Choi, Mi-
chael Finney, Janna Fishman, Yukyan Lam, Bethany Lobo, Jacob Mermelstein, Jessie Mishkin, 
K. Joon Oh, Christina Olson, Erika Reinders, Joshua Salzman, Greg Skidmore, and Elizabeth 
Stark for outstanding research assistance. 
  1  See N EIL  RANDALL,  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  INTERNET  25–26 ( 1997); Living Internet, 
ARPANET — The First Internet, http://livinginternet.com/i/ii_arpanet.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 
2006).  The first message sent over the system was intended to be “log”; the transmission crashed 
after the second letter, making “lo” the first Internet message.  RANDALL, supra, at 26. 
  2  See RANDALL, supra note 1, at 60 (describing efforts by Vinton Cerf and Robert Kahn to 
develop a protocol by which networks could connect to one another); Wikipedia, History of the 
Internet, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Internet (last visited Apr. 9,  2006) (same); 
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The Internet was also built to be open to any sort of device: any com-
puter or other information processor could be part of the new network 
so long as it was properly interfaced, an exercise requiring minimal 
technical effort.3  These principles and their implementing protocols 
have remained essentially unchanged since the Internet comprised ex-
actly two network subscribers,4 even as the network has grown to 
reach hundreds of millions of people in the developed and developing 
worlds.5 
Both mirroring and contributing to the Internet’s explosive growth 
has been the growth of the personal computer (PC): an affordable, 
multifunctional device that is readily available at retail outlets and eas-
ily reconfigurable by its users for any number of purposes.  The audi-
ence writing software for PCs, including software that is Internet ca-
pable, is itself massive and varied.6  This diverse audience has driven 
the variety of applications powering the rapid technological innovation 
to which we have become accustomed, in turn driving innovation in 
expressive endeavors such as politics, entertainment, journalism, and 
education.7 
Though the openness of the Internet and the PC to third-party con-
tribution is now so persistent and universal as to seem inevitable, these 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
see also Barry M. Leiner et al., The Past and Future History of the Internet, COMM. ACM, Feb. 
1997, at 102, 104 (remarking that “[t]he Internet was not designed for just one application but as a 
general infrastructure on which new applications could be conceived”). 
  3  See Brian E. Carpenter, Architectural Principles of the Internet (1996), http://www.ietf.org/ 
rfc/rfc1958.txt (describing the need for design to accommodate heterogeneous hardware); see also 
Leander Kahney, Jacking into Home Networking, WIRED  NEWS, May 4,  2000, http:// 
www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,36078,00.html (describing a “residential gateway” device 
that allows consumers to establish home networks); Leander Kahney, Your Car: The Next Net Ap-
pliance, WIRED  NEWS, Mar. 5,  2001, http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,42104,00. 
html (describing an embedded operating system that could enable various consumer appliances to 
connect to the Internet). 
  4  For additional background on the history of the Internet, see Living Internet, supra note 1. 
  5  See Internet World Stats, Internet Usage Statistics — The Big Picture, http://www. 
internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2006) (estimating that over one billion people 
used the Internet in 2005). 
  6  See Steve Lohr, Microsoft To Offer Streamlined Products Aimed at Programmers, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 29, 2004, at C2 (estimating that there are approximately eighteen million amateur 
programmers worldwide, about three times the number of professional programmers).  
  7  See PAUL FREIBERGER & MICHAEL SWAINE, FIRE IN THE VALLEY 78–79, 118–24 (2d 
ed. 2000) (describing the role of hobbyists and enthusiasts in establishing the market for PCs); 
Howard Rheingold, Innovation and the Amateur Spirit (Dec. 23, 1999), http://www.hrea.org/lists/ 
huridocs-tech/markup/msg00383.html (noting the role of amateurs in “creat[ing] a platform that 
had never existed before — the personal computer linked to a global network — before profes-
sionals could build industries on that platform”); cf. Robert Horvitz, Program Manager, Global 
Internet Policy Inst., ICT Applications, UNDESA-UNITAR “E-Government for Development” 
Seminar  2 (June 23–28,  2003),  available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/ 
documents/un/unpan012242.pdf (noting that “[t]he first PC manufacturers encouraged their cus-
tomers to create new applications” and “saw amateur programmers and electronics hobbyists as 
the primary market for PCs”). 2006]  THE GENERATIVE INTERNET  1977 
technologies need not have been configured to allow instant contribu-
tion from a broad range of third parties.  This Article sketches the 
generative features of the Internet and PCs, along with the alternative 
configurations that these instrumentalities defeated.  This Article then 
describes the ways in which the technologies’ openness to third-party 
innovation, though possessing a powerful inertia that so far has re-
sisted regulatory and commercial attempts at control, is increasingly at 
odds with itself. 
Internet technologists have for too long ignored Internet and PC se-
curity threats that might precipitate an unprecedented intervention 
into the way today’s Internet and PCs work.  These security threats 
are more pervasive than the particular vulnerabilities arising from 
bugs in a particular operating system (OS): so long as OSs permit con-
sumers to run third-party code — the sine qua non of a PC OS — us-
ers can execute malicious code and thereby endanger their own work 
and that of others on the network.  A drumbeat of trust-related con-
cerns plausibly could fuel a gradual but fundamental shift in consumer 
demand toward increased stability in computing platforms.  Such a 
shift would interact with existing regulatory and commercial pressures 
— each grounded in advancing economically rational and often legally 
protected interests — to create solutions that make it not merely possi-
ble, but likely, that the personal computing and networking environ-
ment of tomorrow will be sadly hobbled, bearing little resemblance to 
the one that most of the world enjoys today. 
The most plausible path along which the Internet might develop is 
one that finds greater stability by imposing greater constraint on, if not 
outright elimination of, the capacity of upstart innovators to demon-
strate and deploy their genius to large audiences.  Financial transac-
tions over such an Internet will be more trustworthy, but the range of 
its users’ business models will be narrow.  This Internet’s attached 
consumer hardware will be easier to understand and will be easier to 
use for purposes that the hardware manufacturers preconceive, but it 
will be off limits to amateur tinkering.  Had such a state of affairs 
evolved by the Internet’s twenty-fifth anniversary in 1994, many of its 
formerly unusual and now central uses would never have developed 
because the software underlying those uses would have lacked a plat-
form for exposure to, and acceptance by, a critical mass of users. 
Those who treasure the Internet’s generative features must assess 
the prospects of either satisfying or frustrating the growing forces 
against those features so that a radically different technology configu-
ration need not come about.  Precisely because the future is uncertain, 
those who care about openness and the innovation that today’s Inter-
net and PC facilitate should not sacrifice the good to the perfect — or 
the future to the present — by seeking simply to maintain a tenuous 
technological status quo in the face of inexorable pressure to change.  
Rather, we should establish the principles that will blunt the most un-1978  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 119:1974  
appealing features of a more locked-down technological future while 
acknowledging that unprecedented and, to many who work with in-
formation technology, genuinely unthinkable boundaries could likely 
become the rules from which we must negotiate exceptions. 
Although these matters are of central importance to cyberlaw, they 
have generally remained out of focus in our field’s evolving literature, 
which has struggled to identify precisely what is so valuable about to-
day’s Internet and which has focused on network openness to the ex-
clusion of endpoint openness.  Recognition of the importance and pre-
cariousness of the generative Internet has significant implications for, 
among other issues, the case that Internet service providers (ISPs) 
should unswervingly observe end-to-end neutrality, the proper focus of 
efforts under the rubric of “Internet governance,” the multifaceted de-
bate over digital rights management (DRM), and prospects for Internet 
censorship and filtering by authoritarian regimes. 
Scholars such as Professors Yochai Benkler, Mark Lemley, and 
Lawrence Lessig have crystallized concern about keeping the Internet 
“open,” translating a decades-old technical end-to-end argument con-
cerning simplicity in network protocol design into a claim that ISPs 
should refrain from discriminating against particular sources or types 
of data.8  There is much merit to an open Internet, but this argument 
is really a proxy for something deeper: a generative networked grid.  
Those who make paramount “network neutrality” derived from end-
to-end theory confuse means and ends, focusing on “network” without 
regard to a particular network policy’s influence on the design of net-
work endpoints such as PCs.  As a result of this focus, political advo-
cates of end-to-end are too often myopic; many writers seem to pre-
sume current PC and OS architecture to be fixed in an “open” position.  
If they can be persuaded to see a larger picture, they may agree to 
some compromises at the network level.  If complete fidelity to end-to-
end network neutrality persists, our PCs may be replaced by informa-
tion appliances or may undergo a transformation from open platforms 
to gated communities to prisons, creating a consumer information en-
vironment that betrays the very principles that animate end-to-end 
theory. 
The much-touted differences between free and proprietary PC OSs 
may not capture what is most important to the Internet’s future.  Pro-
prietary systems can remain “open,” as many do, by permitting unaf-
filiated third parties to write superseding programs and permitting PC 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  8  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era,  48 UCLA  L.  REV.  925 ( 2001);  cf. Yochai 
Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 
1245, 1266–67 (2003) (decrying the ability of ISPs to control content as an “affront to [individual] 
autonomy”). 2006]  THE GENERATIVE INTERNET  1979 
owners to install these programs without requiring any gatekeeping by 
the OS provider.  In this sense, debates about the future of our PC ex-
perience should focus less on such common battles as Linux versus 
Microsoft Windows, as both are “open” under this definition, and more 
on generative versus nongenerative: understanding which platforms 
will remain open to third-party innovation and which will not. 
The focus on the management of domain names among those par-
ticipating in dialogues about Internet governance is equally unfortu-
nate.  Too much scholarly effort has been devoted to the question of 
institutional governance of this small and shrinking aspect of the 
Internet landscape.9  When juxtaposed with the generativity problem, 
domain names matter little.  Cyberlaw’s challenge ought to be to find 
ways of regulating — though not necessarily through direct state ac-
tion — which code can and cannot be readily disseminated and run 
upon the generative grid of Internet and PCs, lest consumer sentiment 
and preexisting regulatory pressures prematurely and tragically termi-
nate the grand experiment that is the Internet today. 
New software tools might enable collective regulation if they can 
inform Internet users about the nature of new code by drawing on 
knowledge from the Internet itself, generated by the experiences of 
others who have run such code.  Collective regulation might also entail 
new OS designs that chart a middle path between a locked-down PC 
on the one hand and an utterly open one on the other, such as an OS 
that permits users to shift their computers between “safe” and “ex-
perimental” modes, classifying new or otherwise suspect code as suited 
for only the experimental zone of the machine. 
In other words, to Professor Lessig and those more categorically 
libertarian than he, this Article seeks to explain why drawing a bright 
line against nearly any form of increased Internet regulability is no 
longer tenable.  Those concerned about preserving flexibility in Inter-
net behavior and coding should participate meaningfully in debates 
about changes to network and PC architecture, helping to ameliorate 
rather than ignore the problems caused by such flexibility that, if left 
unchecked, will result in unfortunate, hamhanded changes to the way 
mainstream consumers experience cyberspace. 
An understanding of the value of generativity, the risks of its ex-
cesses, and the possible means to reconcile the two, stands to reinvigo-
rate the debate over DRM systems.  In particular, this understanding 
promises to show how, despite no discernable movement toward the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  9  See, e.g., Robert A. Badgley, Internet Domain Names and ICANN Arbitration: The Emerg-
ing “Law” of Domain Name Custody Disputes,  5 T EX.  REV.  L.  &  POL.  343 ( 2001); Tamar 
Frankel,  Governing by Negotiation: The Internet Naming System,  12 C ARDOZO  J.  INT’L  & 
COMP. L. 449 (2004); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN To Route 
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000). 1980  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 119:1974  
locked-down dystopias Professors Julie Cohen and Pamela Samuelson 
predicted in the late 1990s,10 changing conditions are swinging con-
sumer sentiment in favor of architectures that promote effective DRM.  
This realignment calls for more than general opposition to laws that 
prohibit DRM circumvention or that mandate particular DRM 
schemes: it also calls for a vision of affirmative technology policy — 
one that includes some measure of added regulability of intellectual 
property — that has so far proven elusive. 
Finally, some methods that could be plausibly employed in the 
Western world to make PCs more tame for stability’s sake can greatly 
affect the prospects for Internet censorship and surveillance by au-
thoritarian regimes in other parts of the world.  If PC technology is in-
aptly refined or replaced to create new points of control in the distribu-
tion of new code, such technology is horizontally portable to these 
regimes — regimes that currently effect their censorship through leaky 
network blockages rather than PC lockdown or replacement. 
II.  A MAPPING OF GENERATIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
To emphasize the features and virtues of an open Internet and PC, 
and to help assess what features to give up (or blunt) to control some 
of the excesses wrought by placing such a powerfully modifiable tech-
nology into the mainstream, it is helpful to be clear about the meaning 
of generativity, the essential quality animating the trajectory of infor-
mation technology innovation.  Generativity denotes a technology’s 
overall capacity to produce unprompted change driven by large, var-
ied, and uncoordinated audiences.  The grid of PCs connected by the 
Internet has developed in such a way that it is consummately genera-
tive.  From the beginning, the PC has been designed to run almost any 
program created by the manufacturer, the user, or a remote third party 
and to make the creation of such programs a relatively easy task.   
When these highly adaptable machines are connected to a network 
with little centralized control, the result is a grid that is nearly com-
pletely open to the creation and rapid distribution of the innovations 
of technology-savvy users to a mass audience that can enjoy those in-
novations without having to know how they work. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  10  See Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws De-
signed To Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161 (1997) (advocating caution in adoption of 
laws protecting DRM); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why 
the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need To Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999) 
(arguing that the United States’s DRM anticircumvention laws are overbroad and unclear). 2006]  THE GENERATIVE INTERNET  1981 
A.  Generative Technologies Defined 
Generativity is a function of a technology’s capacity for leverage 
across a range of tasks, adaptability to a range of different tasks, ease 
of mastery, and accessibility. 
1.  Capacity for Leverage. — Our world teems with useful objects, 
natural and artificial, tangible and intangible; leverage describes the 
extent to which these objects enable valuable accomplishments that 
otherwise would be either impossible or not worth the effort to 
achieve.  Examples of devices or systems that have a high capacity for 
leverage include a lever itself (with respect to lifting physical objects), 
a band saw (cutting them), an airplane (getting from one place to an-
other), a piece of paper (hosting written language), or an alphabet 
(constructing words).  A generative technology makes difficult jobs 
easier.  The more effort a device or technology saves — compare a 
sharp knife to a dull one — the more generative it is.  The greater the 
variety of accomplishments it enables — compare a sharp Swiss Army 
knife to a sharp regular knife — the more generative it is.11 
2.  Adaptability. — Adaptability refers to both the breadth of a 
technology’s use without change and the readiness with which it might 
be modified to broaden its range of uses.  A given instrumentality may 
be highly leveraging, yet suited only to a limited range of applications.  
For example, although a plowshare can enable the planting of a vari-
ety of seeds, planting is its essential purpose.  Its comparative leverage 
quickly vanishes when devoted to other tasks, such as holding doors 
open, and it is not readily modifiable for new purposes.  The same 
goes for swords (presuming they are indeed difficult to beat into plow-
shares), guns, chairs, band saws, and even airplanes.  In contrast, pa-
per obtained for writing can instead (or additionally) be used to wrap 
fish.  A technology that offers hundreds of different additional kinds of 
uses is more adaptable and, all else equal, more generative than a 
technology that offers fewer kinds of uses.  Adaptability in a tool bet-
ter permits leverage for previously unforeseen purposes. 
3.  Ease of Mastery. — A technology’s ease of mastery reflects how 
easy it is for broad audiences both to adopt and to adapt it: how much 
skill is necessary to make use of its leverage for tasks they care about, 
regardless of whether the technology was designed with those tasks in 
mind.  An airplane is neither easy to fly nor easy to modify for new 
purposes, not only because it is not inherently adaptable to purposes 
other than transportation, but also because of the skill required to 
make whatever transformative modifications might be possible and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  11  Cf. FREIBERGER & SWAINE, supra note 7, at 200 (describing a combined word processor, 
spreadsheet, database, and programming language called Framework as a “remarkably powerful 
and advanced product” that “represented a ‘Swiss army knife’ approach” to software design). 1982  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 119:1974  
because of the risk of physical injury if one poorly executes such modi-
fications.  Paper, in contrast, is readily mastered: children can learn 
how to use it the moment they enter preschool, whether to draw on or 
to fold into a paper airplane (itself much easier to fly and modify than 
a real one).  Ease of mastery also refers to the ease with which people 
might deploy and adapt a given technology without necessarily mas-
tering all possible uses.  Handling a pencil takes a mere moment to 
understand and put to many uses even though it might require innate 
artistic talent and a lifetime of practice to achieve da Vincian levels of 
mastery with it.  That is, much of the pencil’s generativity stems from 
how useful it is both to the neophyte and to the master. 
4.  Accessibility. — The more readily people can come to use and 
control a technology, along with what information might be required 
to master it, the more accessible the technology is.  Barriers to accessi-
bility can include the sheer expense of producing (and therefore con-
suming) the technology, taxes and regulations imposed on its adoption 
or use (for example, to serve a government interest directly or to help 
private parties monopolize the technology through intellectual property 
law), and the use of secrecy and obfuscation by its producers to main-
tain scarcity without necessarily relying upon an affirmative intellec-
tual property interest.12 
By this reckoning of accessibility, paper and plowshares are highly 
accessible, planes hardly at all, and cars somewhere in the middle.  It 
might be easy to learn how to drive a car, but cars are expensive, and 
the privilege of driving, once earned by demonstrating driving skill, 
is revocable by the government.  Moreover, given the nature of cars 
and driving, such revocation is not prohibitively expensive to enforce 
effectively. 
5.  Generativity Revisited. — As defined by these four criteria, 
generativity increases with the ability of users to generate new, valu-
able uses that are easy to distribute and are in turn sources of further 
innovation.  It is difficult to identify in 2006 a technology bundle more 
generative than the PC and the Internet to which it attaches. 
B.  The Generative PC 
The modern PC’s generativity flows from a separation of hardware 
from software.13  From the earliest days of computing, this separation 
has been sensible, but it is not necessary.  Both hardware and software 
comprise sets of instructions that operate upon informational inputs to 
create informational outputs; the essential difference is that hardware 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  12  See Wikipedia, Obfuscated Code, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obfuscated_code (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2006) (describing the practical utility of obfuscated source code). 
  13  See P AUL E. CERUZZI, A HISTORY OF MODERN COMPUTING 81–84 (2d ed. 2003) (de-
scribing the insights that led to code stored on removable media).  2006]  THE GENERATIVE INTERNET  1983 
is not easy to change once it leaves the factory.  If the manufacturer 
knows enough about the computational task a machine will be asked 
to perform, the instructions to perform the task could be “bolted in” as 
hardware.  Indeed, “bolting” is exactly what is done with an analog 
adding machine, digital calculator, “smart” typewriter, or the firmware 
within a coffeemaker that enables it to begin brewing at a user-selected 
time.  These devices are all hardware and no software.  Or, as some 
might say, their software is inside their hardware. 
The essence — and genius — of software standing alone is that it 
allows unmodified hardware to execute a new algorithm, obviating the 
difficult and expensive process of embedding that algorithm in hard-
ware.14  PCs carry on research computing’s tradition of separating 
hardware and software by allowing the user to input new code.  Such 
code can be loaded and run even once the machine is solely in the con-
sumer’s hands.  Thus, the manufacturer can write new software after 
the computer leaves the factory, and a consumer needs to know merely 
how to load the cassette, diskette, or cartridge containing the software 
to enjoy its benefits.  (In today’s networked environment, the con-
sumer need not take any action at all for such reprogramming to take 
place.)  Further, software is comparatively easy for the manufacturer 
to develop because PCs carry on another sensible tradition of their in-
stitutional forbears: they make use of OSs.15  OSs provide a higher 
level of abstraction at which the programmer can implement his or her 
algorithms, allowing a programmer to take shortcuts when creating 
software.16  The ability to reprogram using external inputs provides 
adaptability; OSs provide leverage and ease of mastery. 
Most significant, PCs were and are accessible.  They were designed 
to run software not written by the PC manufacturer or OS publisher, 
including software written by those with whom these manufacturers 
had no special arrangements.17  Early PC manufacturers not only pub-
lished the documentation necessary to write software that would run 
on their OSs, but also bundled high-level programming languages 
along with their computers so that users themselves could learn to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  14  See WINN L. ROSCH, WINN L. ROSCH HARDWARE BIBLE 35–38 (6th ed. 2003). 
  15  See M ARTIN  CAMPBELL-KELLY,  FROM  AIRLINE  RESERVATIONS  TO  SONIC  THE 
HEDGEHOG: A HISTORY OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 206–07 (2003); Wikipedia, History of 
Operating Systems, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_operating_systems (last visited Apr. 9, 
2006). 
  16  These shortcuts can take the form of new functions.  For example, a computer can be told 
simply to average a set of numbers, relieving the programmer of the more tedious job of explicitly 
asking it to sum the numbers and then divide by the number of numbers.  Shortcuts can also be 
specific to the functions that a computer’s nonprocessing hardware can perform.  For example, 
rather than having to communicate directly with a printer and know exactly how it expects to 
receive data, the programmer simply can tell an OS to print, and the OS will take care of the rest. 
  17  See FREIBERGER & SWAINE, supra note 7, at 199. 1984  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 119:1974  
write software for use on their (and potentially others’) computers.18  
High-level programming languages are like automatic rather than 
manual transmissions for cars: they do not make PCs more leveraged, 
but they do make PCs accessible to a wider audience of program-
mers.19  This increased accessibility enables programmers to produce 
software that might not otherwise be written. 
That the resulting PC was one that its own users could — and did 
— program is significant.  The PC’s truly transformative potential is 
fully understood, however, as a product of its overall generativity. 
PCs were genuinely adaptable to any number of undertakings by 
people with very different backgrounds and goals.  The early OSs 
lacked capabilities we take for granted today, such as multitasking, but 
they made it possible for programmers to write useful software with 
modest amounts of effort and understanding.20 
Users who wrote their own software and thought it suited for gen-
eral use could hang out the shingle in the software business or simply 
share the software with others.  A market in third-party software de-
veloped and saw a range of players, from commercial software pub-
lishers employing thousands of people, to collaborative software pro-
jects that made their outputs freely available, to hobbyists who 
showcased and sold their wares by advertising in computer user maga-
zines or through local computer user groups.21  Such a range of devel-
opers enhanced the variety of applications that were written not only 
because accessibility arguably increased the sheer number of people 
coding, but also because people coded for different reasons.  While 
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sales.  SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. ASS’N, PACKAGED SOFTWARE INDUSTRY REVENUE AND 
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hobbyists might code for fun, others might code out of necessity, desir-
ing an application but not having enough money to hire a commercial 
software development firm.  And, of course, commercial firms could 
provide customized programming services to individual users or could 
develop packaged software aimed at broad markets. 
This variety is important because the usual mechanisms that firms 
use to gauge and serve market demand for particular applications may 
not provide enough insight to generate every valuable application.  It 
might seem obvious, for example, that a spreadsheet would be of great 
use to someone stuck with an adding machine, but the differences be-
tween the new application and the old method may prevent firms from 
recognizing the former as better serving other tasks.  The PC, however, 
allowed multiple paths for the creation of new applications: Firms 
could attempt to gauge market need and then write and market an 
application to meet that need.  Alternatively, people with needs could 
commission firms to write software.  Finally, some could simply write 
the software themselves. 
This configuration — a varied audience of software writers, most 
unaffiliated with the manufacturers of the PCs for which they wrote 
software — turned out to benefit the manufacturers, too, because 
greater availability of software enhanced the value of PCs and their 
OSs.  Although many users were tinkerers, many more users sought 
PCs to accomplish particular purposes nearly out of the box; PC 
manufacturers could tout to the latter the instant uses of their ma-
chines provided by the growing body of available software. 
Adapting a metaphor from Internet architecture, PC architecture 
can be understood as shaped like an hourglass.22  PC OSs sit in the 
narrow middle of the hourglass; most evolved slowly because proprie-
tary OSs were closed to significant outside innovation.  At the broad 
bottom of the PC hourglass lies cheap, commoditized hardware.  At 
the broad top of the hourglass sits the application layer, in which most 
PC innovation takes place.  Indeed, the computer and its OS are prod-
ucts, not services, and although the product life might be extended 
through upgrades, such as the addition of new physical memory chips 
or OS upgrades, the true value of the PC lies in its availability and 
stability as a platform for further innovation — running applications 
from a variety of sources, including the users themselves, and thus lev-
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  22  Cf. COMM. ON THE INTERNET IN THE EVOLVING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE ET AL., 
THE  INTERNET’S  COMING  OF  AGE  36–38,  126–30 ( 2001) [hereinafter COMING  OF  AGE] 
(analogizing the architecture of the Internet to an hourglass because “the minimal required ele-
ments appear at the narrowest point, and an ever-increasing set of choices fills the wider top and 
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eraging the built-in power of the OS for a breathtaking range of 
tasks.23 
Despite the scholarly and commercial attention paid to the debate 
between free and proprietary OSs,24 the generativity of the PC de-
pends little on whether its OS is free and open or proprietary and 
closed — that is, whether the OS may be modified by end users and 
third-party software developers.  A closed OS like Windows can be 
and has been a highly generative technology.  Windows is generative, 
for instance, because its application programming interfaces enable a 
programmer to rework nearly any part of the PC’s functionality and 
give external developers ready access to the PC’s hardware inputs and 
outputs, including scanners, cameras, printers, monitors, and mass 
storage.  Therefore, nearly any desired change to the way Windows 
works can be imitated by code placed at the application level.25  The 
qualities of an OS that are most important have to do with making 
computing power, and the myriad tasks it can accomplish, available 
for varied audiences to adapt, share, and use through the ready crea-
tion and exchange of application software.  If this metric is used, de-
bates over whether the OS source code itself should be modifiable are 
secondary. 
Closed but generative OSs — largely Microsoft DOS and then Mi-
crosoft Windows — dominate the latter half of the story of the PC’s 
rise, and their early applications outperformed their appliance-based 
counterparts.  For example, despite the head start from IBM’s produc-
tion of a paper tape–based word processing unit in World War II, 
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dedicated word processing appliances26 have been trounced by PCs 
running word processing software.  PC spreadsheet software has never 
known a closed, appliance-based consumer product as a competitor;27 
PCs have proven viable substitutes for video game consoles as plat-
forms for gaming;28 and even cash registers have been given a run for 
their money by PCs configured to record sales and customer informa-
tion, accept credit card numbers, and exchange cash at retail points of 
sale.29 
The technology and market structures that account for the highly 
generative PC have endured despite the roller coaster of hardware and 
software producer fragmentation and consolidation that make PC in-
dustry history otherwise heterogeneous.30  These structures and their 
implications can, and plausibly will, change in the near future.  To un-
derstand these potential changes, their implications, and why they 
should be viewed with concern and addressed by action designed to 
minimize their untoward effects, it is important first to understand 
roughly analogous changes to the structure of the Internet that are 
presently afoot.  As the remainder of this Part explains, the line be-
tween the PC and the Internet has become vanishingly thin, and it is 
no longer helpful to consider them separately when thinking about the 
future of consumer information technology and its relation to innova-
tion and creativity. 
C.  The Generative Internet 
The Internet today is exceptionally generative.  It can be leveraged: 
its protocols solve difficult problems of data distribution, making it 
much cheaper to implement network-aware services.31  It is adaptable 
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in the sense that its basic framework for the interconnection of nodes is 
amenable to a large number of applications, from e-mail and instant 
messaging to telephony and streaming video.32  This adaptability ex-
ists in large part because Internet protocol relies on few assumptions 
about the purposes for which it will be used and because it efficiently 
scales to accommodate large amounts of data and large numbers of us-
ers.33  It is easy to master because it is structured to allow users to de-
sign new applications without having to know or worry about the in-
tricacies of packet routing.34   And it is accessible because, at the 
functional level, there is no central gatekeeper with which to negotiate 
access and because its protocols are publicly available and not subject 
to intellectual property restrictions.35  Thus, programmers independent 
of the Internet’s architects and service providers can offer, and con-
sumers can accept, new software or services. 
How did this state of affairs come to pass? Unlike, say, FedEx, 
whose wildly successful offline package delivery network depended 
initially on the financial support of venture capitalists to create an effi-
cient physical infrastructure, those individuals thinking about the 
Internet in the 1960s and 1970s planned a network that would cobble 
together existing networks and then wring as much use as possible 
from them.36 
The network’s design is perhaps best crystallized in a seminal 1984 
paper entitled End-to-End Arguments in System Design.37  As this pa-
per describes, the Internet’s framers intended an hourglass design, 
with a simple set of narrow and slow-changing protocols in the middle, 
resting on an open stable of physical carriers at the bottom and any 
number of applications written by third parties on the top.  The Inter-
net hourglass, despite having been conceived by an utterly different 
group of architects from those who designed or structured the market 
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for PCs, thus mirrors PC architecture in key respects.  The network is 
indifferent to both the physical media on which it operates and the na-
ture of the data it passes, just as a PC OS is open to running upon a 
variety of physical hardware “below” and to supporting any number of 
applications from various sources “above.” 
The authors of End-to-End Arguments describe, as an engineering 
matter, why it is better to keep the basic network operating protocols 
simple — and thus to implement desired features at, or at least near, 
the endpoints of the networks.38  Such features as error correction in 
data transmission are best executed by client-side applications that 
check whether data has reached its destination intact rather than by 
the routers in the middle of the chain that pass data along.39  Ideas 
that entail changing the way the routers on the Internet work — ideas 
that try to make them “smarter” and more discerning about the data 
they choose to pass — challenge end-to-end philosophy. 
The design of the Internet also reflects both the resource limitations 
and intellectual interests of its creators, who were primarily academic 
researchers and moonlighting corporate engineers.  These individuals 
did not command the vast resources needed to implement a global net-
work and had little interest in exercising control over the network or 
its users’ behavior.40  Energy spent running the network was seen as a 
burden; the engineers preferred to design elegant and efficient proto-
cols whose success was measured precisely by their ability to run 
without effort.  Keeping options open for growth and future develop-
ment was seen as sensible,41 and abuse of the network was of little 
worry because the people using it were the very people designing it — 
a culturally homogenous set of people bound by their desire to see the 
network work. 
Internet designers recognized the absence of persistent connections 
between any two nodes of the network,42 and they wanted to allow 
additions to the network that neither taxed a central hub nor required 
centrally managed adjustments to overall network topography.43  
These constraints inspired the development of a stateless protocol — 
one that did not presume continuous connections or centralized knowl-
edge of those connections — and packet switching,44 which broke all 
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data into small, discrete packets and permitted multiple users to share 
a connection, with each sending a snippet of data and then allowing 
someone else’s data to pass.  The constraints also inspired the funda-
mental protocols of packet routing, by which any number of routers in 
a network — each owned and managed by a different entity — main-
tain tables indicating in which rough direction data should travel 
without knowing the exact path to the data’s final destination.45 
A flexible, robust platform for innovation from all corners sprang 
from these technical and social underpinnings.  Two further historical 
developments assured that an easy-to-master Internet would also be 
extraordinarily accessible.  First, the early Internet consisted of nodes 
primarily at university computer science departments, U.S. govern-
ment research units, and select technology companies with an interest 
in cutting-edge network research.46  These institutions collaborated on 
advances in bandwidth management and tools for researchers to use 
for communication and discussion.47  But consumer applications were 
nowhere to be found until the Internet began accepting commercial in-
terconnections without requiring academic or government research 
justifications, and the population at large was solicited to join.48  This 
historical development — the withering away of the norms against 
commercial use and broad interconnection that had been reflected in a 
National Science Foundation admonishment that its contribution to 
the functioning Internet backbone be used for noncommercial pur-
poses49 — greatly increased the Internet’s generativity.  It opened de-
velopment of networked technologies to a broad, commercially driven 
audience that individual companies running proprietary services did 
not think to invite and that the original designers of the Internet 
would not have thought to include in the design process. 
A second historical development is easily overlooked because it 
may in retrospect seem inevitable: the dominance of the Internet as the 
network to which PCs connected, rather than the emergence of pro-
prietary networks analogous to the information appliances that PCs 
themselves beat.  The first large-scale networking of consumer PCs 
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took place through self-contained “walled garden” networks like 
CompuServe, The Source, and Prodigy.50  Each network connected its 
members only to other subscribing members and to content managed 
and cleared through the network proprietor.  For example, as early as 
1983, a home computer user with a CompuServe subscription was able 
to engage in a variety of activities — reading news feeds, sending e-
mail, posting messages on public bulletin boards, and participating in 
rudimentary multiplayer games (again, only with other CompuServe 
subscribers).51  But each of these activities was coded by CompuServe 
or its formal partners, making the network much less generatively ac-
cessible than the Internet would be.  Although CompuServe entered 
into some development agreements with outside software programmers 
and content providers,52 even as the service grew to almost two 
million subscribers by 1994, its core functionalities remained largely 
unchanged.53 
The proprietary services could be leveraged for certain tasks, and 
their technologies were adaptable to many purposes and easy to mas-
ter, but consumers’ and outsiders’ inability to tinker easily with the 
services limited their generativity.54  They were more like early video 
game consoles55 than PCs: capable of multiple uses, through the devel-
opment of individual “cartridges” approved by central management, 
yet slow to evolve because potential audiences of developers were 
slowed or shut out by centralized control over the network’s services. 
The computers first attached to the Internet were mainframes and 
minicomputers of the sort typically found within university computer 
science departments,56 and early desktop access to the Internet came 
through specialized nonconsumer workstations, many running variants 
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of the UNIX OS.57  As the Internet expanded and came to appeal to 
nonexpert participants, the millions of PCs in consumer hands were a 
natural source of Internet growth.58  Despite the potential market, 
however, no major OS producer or software development firm quickly 
moved to design Internet protocol compatibility into PC OSs.  PCs 
could access “walled garden” proprietary services, but their ability to 
run Internet-aware applications locally was limited. 
A single hobbyist took advantage of PC generativity and produced 
and distributed the missing technological link.  Peter Tattam, an em-
ployee in the psychology department of the University of Tasmania, 
wrote Trumpet Winsock, a program that allowed owners of PCs run-
ning Microsoft Windows to forge a point-to-point Internet connection 
with the servers run by the nascent ISP industry.59  Ready consumer 
access to Internet-enabled applications such as Winsock, coupled with 
the development of graphical World Wide Web protocols and the PC 
browsers to support them — all initially noncommercial ventures — 
marked the beginning of the end of proprietary information services 
and peer-to-peer telephone-networked environments like electronic 
bulletin boards.  After recognizing the popularity of Tattam’s software, 
Microsoft bundled the functionality of Winsock with later versions of 
Windows 95.60  
As PC users found themselves increasingly able to access the Inter-
net, proprietary network operators cum content providers scrambled to 
reorient their business models away from corralled content and toward 
accessibility to the wider Internet.61  These online service providers 
quickly became mere ISPs, with their users branching out to the thriv-
ing Internet for programs and services.62  Services like CompuServe’s 
“Electronic Mall” — an e-commerce service allowing outside vendors, 
through arrangements with CompuServe, to sell products to subscrib-
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ers63 — were lost amidst an avalanche of individual websites selling 
goods to anyone with Internet access. 
The greater generativity of the Internet compared to that of pro-
prietary networked content providers created a network externality: as 
more information consumers found their way to the Internet, there 
was more reason for would-be sources of information to set up shop 
there, in turn attracting more consumers.  Dispersed third parties 
could and did write clients and servers for instant messaging,64 web 
browsing,65 e-mail exchange,66 and Internet searching.67  Furthermore, 
the Internet remained broadly accessible: anyone could cheaply sign 
on, immediately becoming a node on the Internet equal to all others in 
information exchange capacity, limited only by bandwidth.  Today, due 
largely to the happenstance of default settings on consumer wireless 
routers, Internet access might be free simply because one is sitting on a 
park bench near the apartment of a broadband subscriber who has 
“gone wireless.”68 
The resulting Internet is a network that no one in particular owns 
and that anyone can join.  Of course, joining requires the acquiescence 
of at least one current Internet participant, but if one is turned away at 
one place, there are innumerable others to court, and commercial ISPs 
provide service at commoditized rates.69  Those who want to offer ser-
vices on the Internet or connect a formerly self-contained local net-
work — such as a school that wants to link its networked computers 
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en.fon.com/info/what-is-fon.php (last visited Apr. 9, 2006). 
  69  See Ken Belson, Yahoo To Offer Portal Service to BellSouth, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005, at 
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OF AGE, supra note 22, at 46 (describing the growth of the ISP market).  In addition, several cities 
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to the Internet — can find fast and reliable broadband Internet access 
for several hundred dollars per month.70  Quality of service (QoS) — 
consistent bandwidth between two points71 — is difficult to achieve 
because the Internet, unlike a physical distribution network run by one 
party from end to end such as FedEx, comprises so many disparate in-
dividual networks.  Nevertheless, as the backbone has grown and as 
technical innovations have both reduced bandwidth requirements and 
staged content “near” those who request it,72 the network has proven 
remarkably effective even in areas — like person-to-person video and 
audio transmission — in which it at first fell short. 
D.  The Generative Grid 
Both noncommercial and commercial enterprises have taken ad-
vantage of open PC and Internet technology, developing a variety of 
Internet-enabled applications and services, many going from imple-
mentation to popularity (or notoriety) in a matter of months or even 
days.  Yahoo!, Amazon.com, eBay, flickr, the Drudge Report, CNN. 
com, Wikipedia, MySpace: the list of available services and activities 
could go into the millions, even as a small handful of Web sites and 
applications account for a large proportion of online user activity.73  
Some sites, like CNN.com, are online instantiations of existing institu-
tions; others, from PayPal to Geocities, represent new ventures by for-
merly unestablished market participants.  Although many of the offer-
ings created during the dot-com boom years — roughly 1995 to 2000 
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vices, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1–3 (Mar. 10, 2006). 
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— proved premature at best and flatly ill-advised at worst, the fact 
remains that many large companies, including technology-oriented 
ones, ignored the Internet’s potential for too long.74 
Significantly, the last several years have witnessed a proliferation of 
PCs hosting broadband Internet connections.75  The generative PC has 
become intertwined with the generative Internet, and the whole is now 
greater than the sum of its parts.  A critical mass of always-on com-
puters means that processing power for many tasks, ranging from dif-
ficult mathematical computations to rapid transmission of otherwise 
prohibitively large files, can be distributed among hundreds, thou-
sands, or millions of PCs.76  Similarly, it means that much of the in-
formation that once needed to reside on a user’s PC to remain conven-
iently accessible — documents, e-mail, photos, and the like — can 
instead be stored somewhere on the Internet.77  So, too, can the pro-
grams that a user might care to run. 
This still-emerging “generative grid” expands the boundaries of lev-
erage, adaptability, and accessibility for information technology.  It 
also raises the ante for the project of cyberlaw because the slope of this 
innovative curve may nonetheless soon be constrained by some of the 
very factors that have made it so steep.  Such constraints may arise 
because generativity is vulnerability in the current order: the fact that 
tens of millions of machines are connected to networks that can con-
vey reprogramming in a matter of seconds means that those computers 
stand exposed to near-instantaneous change.  This kind of generativity 
keeps publishers vulnerable to the latest tools of intellectual property 
infringement, crafted ever more cleverly to evade monitoring and con-
trol, and available for installation within moments everywhere.  It also 
opens PCs to the prospect of mass infection by a computer virus that 
exploits either user ignorance or a security vulnerability that allows 
code from the network to run on a PC without approval by its owner.  
Shoring up these vulnerabilities will require substantial changes in 
some aspects of the grid, and such changes are sure to affect the cur-
rent level of generativity.  Faced with the prospect of such changes, we 
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must not fight an overly narrow if well-intentioned battle simply to 
preserve end-to-end network neutrality or to focus on relative triviali-
ties like domain names and cookies.  Recognizing the true value of the 
grid — its hypergenerativity — along with the magnitude of its vul-
nerabilities and the implications of eliminating those vulnerabilities, 
leads to the realization that we should instead carefully tailor reforms 
to address those vulnerabilities with minimal impact on generativity. 
III.  GENERATIVE DISCONTENT 
To appreciate the power of the new and growing Internet backlash 
— a backlash that augurs a dramatically different, managed Internet 
of the sort that content providers and others have unsuccessfully 
strived to bring about — one must first identify three powerful groups 
that may find common cause in seeking a less generative grid: regula-
tors (in part driven by threatened economic interests, including those 
of content providers), mature technology industry players, and con-
sumers.  These groups are not natural allies in technology policy, and 
only recently have significant constituencies from all three sectors 
gained momentum in promoting a refashioning of Internet and PC ar-
chitecture that would severely restrict the Internet’s generativity. 
A.  Generative Equilibrium 
Cyberlaw scholarship has developed in three primary strands.   
First, early work examined legal conflicts, usually described in re-
ported judicial opinions, arising from the use of computers and digital 
networks, including the Internet.78  Scholars worked to apply statutory 
or common law doctrine to such conflicts, at times stepping back to 
dwell on whether new circumstances called for entirely new legal ap-
proaches.79  Usually the answer was that they did not: these scholars 
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  78  See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a 
Book, 48 VILL. L. REV. 13 (2003) (arguing that legislation is needed to make digital copyright fol-
low the rules of analog copyright because existing rules do not appropriately constrain Internet 
users); Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First Look at the Emerging Law of Cy-
bermarks, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1995), http://www.law.richmond.edu/jolt/v1i1/burk.html (argu-
ing for the use of trademark law to resolve disputes concerning domain names and similar issues); 
Austan Goolsbee & Jonathan Zittrain, Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Taxing Internet Com-
merce, 52 NAT’L TAX. J. 413 (1999) (noting the difficulty that localities encounter in taxing Inter-
net commerce and presenting empirical evidence suggesting that current legislation is not effec-
tive); I. Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web Sites, 1996 J. ONLINE L. art. 7, 
http://www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/95_96/hardy.html (arguing for the application of trespass 
law to the Internet to protect websites as property); Donald J. Karl, Comment, State Regulation of 
Anonymous Internet Use After ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513 (1998) (noting 
repercussions for Internet freedom in light of a 1997 court decision). 
  79  See, e.g., Goolsbee & Zittrain, supra note 78, at 424–25 (suggesting that Internet commerce 
ought to be taxed under the same regime as other commerce); I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal 
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mostly believed that creative application of existing doctrine, directly 
or by analogy, could resolve most questions.  Professors such as David 
Johnson and David Post disagreed with this view, maintaining in a 
second strand of scholarship that cyberspace is different and therefore 
best regulated by its own sets of rules rather than the laws of territo-
rial governments.80 
In the late 1990s, Professor Lessig and others argued that the de-
bate was too narrow, pioneering yet a third strand of scholarship.  Pro-
fessor Lessig argued that a fundamental insight justifying cyberlaw as 
a distinct field is the way in which technology — as much as the law 
itself — can subtly but profoundly affect people’s behavior: “Code is 
law.”81  He maintained that the real projects of cyberlaw are both to 
correct the common misperception that the Internet is permanently 
unregulable and to reframe doctrinal debates as broader policy-
oriented ones, asking what level of regulability would be appropriate 
to build into digital architectures.  For his part, Professor Lessig ar-
gued that policymakers should typically refrain from using the powers 
of regulation through code — powers that they have often failed, in 
the first instance, to realize they possess.82 
The notion that code is law undergirds a powerful theory, but some 
of its most troubling empirical predictions about the use of code to re-
strict individual freedom have not yet come to pass.  Work by profes-
sors such as Julie Cohen and Pamela Samuelson has echoed Professor 
Lessig’s fears about the ways technology can unduly constrain individ-
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Regime for “Cyberspace,” 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993 (1994) (highlighting mismatches between exist-
ing doctrine and activities in cyberspace and suggesting that new rules may be necessary). 
  80  See David R. Johnson & David G. Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A Medita-
tion on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law,  in C OORDINATING  THE 
INTERNET 62 (Brian Kahin & James H. Keller eds., 1997) (arguing that the Internet should be 
governed by new mechanisms because it cannot be controlled by an existing sovereign); David R. 
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders — The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1367 (1996) (arguing that the Internet’s cross-jurisdictional functioning makes regulation by small 
jurisdictional units impossible).  Several scholars then argued against Johnson and Post’s excep-
tionalist view of the Internet.  See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1199 (1998); see also A. Michael Froomkin, Time To Hug a Bureaucrat, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
139, 144 (2003) (suggesting skepticism regarding Internet self-regulation and arguing that “[f]or 
most e-commerce, there really isn’t an ‘Internet’ in any useful sense any more than there is ‘tele-
phone space’; rather, the Internet is just another quicker, better way of passing information be-
tween machines and people”); Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cy-
berspace,  32 I NT’L  LAW.  1167,  1191 ( 1998) (arguing that the problem of Internet jurisdiction 
arises from the quantity of transactions, not the quality, and that Internet jurisdiction is therefore 
“not uniquely problematic”).  Professor Post later responded to these arguments.  See David G. 
Post, Against “Against Cyberanarchy,” 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365 (2002). 
  81  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 19–20 (1999). 
  82  See id. at 43–60. 1998  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 119:1974  
ual behavior — fears that include a prominent subset of worries about 
socially undesirable digital rights management and “trusted systems.”83 
Trusted systems are systems that can be trusted by outsiders 
against the people who use them.84  In the consumer information tech-
nology context, such systems are typically described as “copyright 
management” or “rights management” systems, although such termi-
nology is loaded.  As critics have been quick to point out, the protec-
tions afforded by these systems need not bear any particular relation-
ship to the rights granted under, say, U.S. copyright law.85  Rather, the 
possible technological restrictions on what a user may do are deter-
mined by the architects themselves and thus may (and often do) pro-
hibit many otherwise legal uses.  An electronic book accessed through 
a rights management system might, for example, have a limitation on 
the number of times it can be printed out, and should the user figure 
out how to print it without regard to the limitation, no fair use defense 
would be available.  Similarly, libraries that subscribe to electronic ma-
terial delivered through copyright management systems may find 
themselves technologically incapable of lending out that material the 
way a traditional library lends out a book, even though the act of lend-
ing is a privilege — a defense to copyright infringement for unlawful 
“distribution” — under the first sale doctrine.86 
The debate over technologically enforced “private” copyright 
schemes in the United States grew after the Digital Millennium Copy-
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right Act87 (DMCA) was signed into law with a raft of complex anti-
circumvention provisions.88  These provisions are intended to support 
private rights management schemes with government sanctions for 
their violation.  They provide both criminal and civil penalties for 
those who use, market, or traffic in technologies designed to circum-
vent technological barriers to copyright infringement.  They also pe-
nalize those who gain mere “access” to such materials, a right not re-
served to the copyright holder.89  For example, if a book has a coin slot 
on the side and requires a would-be reader to insert a coin to read it, 
one who figures out how to open and read it without inserting a coin 
might be violating the anticircumvention provisions — even though 
one would not be directly infringing the exclusive rights of copyright. 
These are the central fears of the “code is law” theory as applied to 
the Internet and PCs: technical barriers prevent people from making 
use of intellectual works, and nearly any destruction of those barriers, 
even to enable lawful use, is unlawful.  But these fears have largely 
remained hypothetical.  To be sure, since the DMCA’s passage a num-
ber of unobtrusive rights management schemes have entered wide cir-
culation.90  Yet only a handful of cases have been brought against 
those who have cracked such schemes,91 and there has been little if 
any decrease in consumers’ capacity to copy digital works, whether for 
fair use or for wholesale piracy.  Programmers have historically been 
able to crack nearly every PC protection scheme, and those less techni-
cally inclined can go to the trouble of generating a fresh copy of a digi-
tal work without having to crack the scheme, exploiting the “analog 
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hole” by, for example, filming a television broadcast or recording a 
playback of a song.92  Once an unprotected copy is generated, it can 
then be shared freely on Internet file-sharing networks that run on 
generative PCs at the behest of their content-hungry users.93 
Thus, the mid-1990s’ fears of digital lockdown through trusted sys-
tems may seem premature or unfounded.  As a practical matter, any 
scheme designed to protect content finds itself rapidly hacked, and the 
hack (or the content protected) in turn finds itself shared with techni-
cally unsophisticated PC owners.  Alternatively, the analog hole can be 
used to create a new, unprotected master copy of protected content.  
The fact remains that so long as code can be freely written by anyone 
and easily distributed to run on PC platforms, trusted systems can 
serve as no more than speed bumps or velvet ropes — barriers that the 
public circumvents should they become more than mere inconven-
iences.  Apple’s iTunes Music Store is a good example of this phe-
nomenon: music tracks purchased through iTunes are encrypted with 
Apple’s proprietary scheme,94 and there are some limitations on their 
use that, although unnoticeable to most consumers, are designed to 
prevent the tracks from immediately circulating on peer-to-peer net-
works.95  But the scheme is easily circumvented by taking music pur-
chased from the store, burning it onto a standard audio CD, and then 
re-ripping the CD into an unprotected format, such as MP3.96 
An important claim endures from the third “code is law” strand of 
cyberlaw scholarship.  Professors Samuelson, Lessig, and Cohen were 
right to raise alarm about such possibilities as losing the ability to read 
anonymously, to lend a copyrighted work to a friend, and to make fair 
use of materials that are encrypted for mere viewing.  However, the 
second strand of scholarship, which includes the empirical claims 
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about Internet separatism advanced by Professor Johnson and David 
Post, appears to explain why the third strand’s concerns are prema-
ture.  Despite worries about regulation and closure, the Internet and 
the PC have largely remained free of regulation for mainstream users 
who experience regulation in the offline world but wish to avoid it in 
the online world, whether to gamble, obtain illegal pornography, or re-
produce copyrighted material. 
The first strand, which advocates incremental doctrinal adaptation 
to new technologies, explains how Internet regulators have indeed 
acted with a light touch even when they might have had more heavy-
handed options.  As I discuss elsewhere, the history of Internet regula-
tion in the Western world has been tentative and restrained, with a fo-
cus by agile Internet regulators on gatekeeping regimes, effected 
through discrete third parties within a sovereign’s jurisdiction or 
through revisions to technical architectures.97  Although Internet regu-
lators are powerful in that they can shape, apply, and enforce the au-
thority of major governments, many have nevertheless proven willing 
to abstain from major intervention. 
This lack of intervention has persisted even as the mainstream 
adoption of the Internet has increased the scale of interests that Inter-
net uses threaten.  Indeed, until 2001, the din of awe and celebration 
surrounding the Internet’s success, including the run-up in stock mar-
ket valuations led by dot-coms, drowned out many objections to and 
discussion about Internet use and reform — who would want to dis-
turb a goose laying golden eggs?  Further, many viewed the Internet as 
immutable and thought the problems it generated should be dealt with 
piecemeal, without considering changes to the way the network func-
tioned — a form of “is-ism” that Professor Lessig’s third strand of cy-
berlaw scholarship famously challenged in the late 1990s even as he 
advocated that the Internet’s technology remain essentially as is, unfet-
tered by regulation.98 
By 2002 the dot-com hangover was in full sway, serving as a back-
drop to a more jaundiced mainstream view of the value of the Inter-
net.  The uptake of consumer broadband, coupled with innovative but 
disruptive applications like the file-sharing service Napster — 
launched by amateurs but funded to the tune of millions of dollars 
during the boom — inspired fear and skepticism rather than envy and 
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mimicry among content providers.  And a number of lawsuits against 
such services, initiated during the crest of the Internet wave, had by 
this time resulted in judgments against their creators.99  The woes of 
content providers have made for a natural starting point in under-
standing the slowly building backlash to the generative Internet, and 
they appropriately continue to inform a large swath of cyberlaw schol-
arship.  But the persistence of the publishers’ problems and the dot-
com bust have not alone persuaded regulators or courts to tinker fun-
damentally with the Internet’s generative capacity.  The duties of 
Western-world ISPs to police or preempt undesirable activities are still 
comparatively light, even after such perceived milestones as the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act and the Supreme Court’s decision against 
file-sharing promoters in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grok-
ster, Ltd.100  Although there is more regulation in such countries as 
China and Saudi Arabia, where ISPs are co-opted to censor content 
and services that governments find objectionable,101 regulatory efforts 
are still framed as exceptions to the rule that where the Internet goes, 
freedom of action by its subscribers follows. 
By incorporating the trajectory of disruption by the generative 
Internet followed by comparatively mild reaction by regulators, the 
three formerly competing strands of cyberlaw scholarship can be rec-
onciled to explain the path of the Internet: Locked-down PCs are pos-
sible but undesirable.  Regulators have been unwilling to take intru-
sive measures to lock down the generative PC and have not tried to 
trim the Internet’s corresponding generative features to any significant 
degree.  The Internet’s growth has made the underlying problems of 
concern to regulators more acute.  Despite their unwillingness to act to 
bring about change, regulators would welcome and even encourage a 
PC/Internet grid that is less exceptional and more regulable. 
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B.  Generativity as Vulnerability: The Cybersecurity Fulcrum 
Mainstream firms and individuals now use the Internet.  Some use 
it primarily to add to the generative grid, whether to create new tech-
nology or new forms of art and other expression facilitated by that 
technology.  Others consume intellectual work over the Internet, 
whether developed generatively or simply ported from traditional dis-
tribution channels for news and entertainment such as CDs, DVDs, 
and broadcast radio and television.  Still others, who use it primarily 
for nonexpressive tasks like shopping or selling, embrace simplicity 
and stability in the workings of the technology. 
Consumers hold the key to the balance of power for tomorrow’s 
Internet.  They are powerful because they drive markets and because 
many vote.  If they remain satisfied with the Internet’s generative 
characteristics — continuing to buy the hardware and software that 
make it possible and to subscribe to ISPs that offer unfiltered access to 
the Internet at large — then the regulatory and industry forces that 
might otherwise wish to constrain the Internet will remain in check, 
maintaining a generative equilibrium.  If, in contrast, consumers 
change their view — not simply tolerating a locked-down Internet but 
embracing it outright — then the balance among competing interests 
that has favored generative innovation will tilt away from it.  Such a 
shift is and will continue to be propelled by an underappreciated phe-
nomenon: the security vulnerabilities inherent in a generative Internet 
populated by mainstream consumers possessing powerful PCs. 
The openness, decentralization, and parity of Internet nodes de-
scribed in Part II are conventionally understood to contribute greatly 
to network security because a network without a center will have no 
central point of breakage.  But these characteristics also create vulner-
abilities, especially when united with both the flaws in the machines 
connecting to the network and the users’ lack of technical sophistica-
tion.  These vulnerabilities have been individually noted but collec-
tively ignored.  A decentralized Internet does not lend itself well to col-
lective action, and its vulnerabilities have too readily been viewed as 
important but not urgent.  Dealing with such vulnerabilities collec-
tively can no longer be forestalled, even though a locus of responsibil-
ity for action is difficult to find within such a diffuse configuration. 
1.  A Threat Unanswered and Unrealized. — On the evening of 
November  2,  1988, a Cornell University graduate student named 
Robert Tappan Morris transmitted a small piece of software over the 
Internet from Cornell to MIT.102  At the time, few PCs were attached 
to the Internet; rather, it was the province of mainframes, minicom-
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puters, and professional workstations in institutional hands.103  Mor-
ris’s software, when run on the MIT machine, sought out other nearby 
computers on the Internet, and it then behaved as if it were a person 
wanting to log onto those machines.104 
The sole purpose of the software — called variously a “virus” or, 
because it could transmit itself independently, a “worm” — was to 
propagate, attempting to crack each newly discovered computer by 
guessing user passwords or exploiting a known security flaw.105  I t  
succeeded.  By the following morning, a large number of machines on 
the Internet had ground to a near halt.  Each had been running the 
same flavor of vulnerable Unix software that the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley had made freely available.106  Estimates of the 
number of computers affected ranged from 1000 to 6000.107 
Within a day or two, puzzled network administrators reverse engi-
neered the worm.108  Its methods of propagation were discovered, and 
the Berkeley computer science department coordinated patches for 
vulnerable Unix systems.109  These patches were made available over 
the Internet, at least to those users who had not elected to disconnect 
their machines to prevent reinfection.110  The worm was traced to 
Morris, who apologized; a later criminal prosecution for the act re-
sulted in his receiving three years’ probation, 400 hours of community 
service, and a $10,050 fine.111 
The Morris worm was a watershed event because it was the first 
virus spread within an always-on network linking always-on com-
puters.  Despite the dramatically smaller and demographically dissimi-
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lar information technology landscape that existed when the Morris 
worm was released, nearly everything one needs to know about the 
risks to Internet and PC security today resides within this story.  Re-
sponses to security breaches today have not significantly improved 
since the response in 1988 to the Morris worm, even though today’s 
computing and networking are categorically larger in scale and less 
tightly controlled. 
The computers of the 1988 Internet could be compromised because 
they were general-purpose machines, running OSs with which outsid-
ers could become familiar and for which these outsiders could write 
executable code.  They were powerful enough to run multiple pro-
grams and host multiple users simultaneously.112  They were genera-
tive.  When first compromised, they were able to meet the demands of 
both the worm and their regular users,  thereby buying time for the 
worm’s propagation before human intervention was made necessary.113  
The OS and other software running on the machines were not perfect: 
they contained flaws that rendered them more generatively accessible 
than their designers intended.114  More important, even without such 
flaws, the machines were designed to be operated at a distance and to 
receive and run software sent from a distance.  They were powered 
and attached to a network continuously, even when not in use by their 
owners.  And the users of these machines were lackadaisical about im-
plementing available fixes to known software vulnerabilities — and 
often utterly, mechanistically predictable in the passwords they chose 
to protect entry into their computer accounts.115 
Each of these facts contributing to the vulnerabilities of networked 
life remains true today, and the striking feature is how few recurrences 
of truly disruptive security incidents there have been since 1988.  Re-
markably, a network designed for communication among academic 
and government researchers scaled beautifully as hundreds of millions 
of new users signed on during the 1990s, a feat all the more impressive 
when one considers how technologically unsavvy most new users were 
in comparison to the 1988 crowd.  However heedless network adminis-
trators in 1988 were of good security hygiene, mainstream consumers 
of the 1990s were far worse.  Few knew how to manage or code their 
PCs, much less how to apply patches rigorously or observe good pass-
word security. 
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Network engineers and government officials did not take any sig-
nificant preventive actions to forestall another Morris-type worm, de-
spite a brief period of soul searching.  Although many who reflected on 
the Morris worm grasped the dimensions of the problem it heralded, 
the problem defied easy solution because management of both the 
Internet and the computers attached to it was so decentralized and be-
cause any truly effective solution would cauterize the very purpose of 
the Internet.116 
The worm did not literally “infect” the Internet itself because it did 
not reprogram the Internet’s various distributed routing mechanisms 
and corresponding links.  Instead, the burden on the network was 
simply increased traffic, as the worm impelled computers to communi-
cate with each other while it attempted to spread ad infinitum.117  The 
computers actually infected were managed by disparate groups and 
individuals who answered to no particular authority for their use or 
for failing to secure them against compromise.118  These features led 
those individuals overseeing network protocols and operation to con-
clude that the worm was not their problem. 
Engineers concerned with the Internet protocols instead responded 
to the Morris worm incident by suggesting that the appropriate solu-
tion was more professionalism among coders.  The Internet Engineer-
ing Task Force — the far-flung, unincorporated group of engineers 
who work on Internet standards and who have defined its protocols 
through a series of formal “request for comments” documents, or RFCs 
— published informational RFC 1135 as a postmortem on the worm 
incident.119  After describing the technical details of the worm, the 
RFC focused on “computer ethics” and the need to instill and enforce 
ethical standards as new people — mostly young computer scientists 
such as Morris — signed on to the Internet.120 
The state of play in 1988, then, was to acknowledge the gravity of 
the worm incident while avoiding structural overreaction to it.  The 
most concrete outcomes were a criminal prosecution of Morris, an ap-
parent consensus within the Internet technical community regarding 
individual responsibility for the problem, and the Department of De-
fense’s creation of the CERT Coordination Center to monitor the over-
all health of the Internet and dispatch news of security threats121 — 
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leaving preemptive or remedial action in the hands of individual com-
puter operators. 
Compared to the computers connected to the 1988 Internet, the 
computers connected to the proprietary consumer networks of the 
1980s described in Part II were not as fundamentally vulnerable be-
cause those networks could be much more readily purged of particular 
security flaws without sacrificing the very foundations of their exis-
tence.122  For example, although it would have been resource intensive, 
CompuServe could have attempted to scan its network traffic at des-
ignated gateways to prevent the spread of a worm.  More important, 
no worm could have spread through CompuServe in the manner of 
Morris’s because the computers attached to CompuServe were config-
ured as mere “dumb terminals”: they exchanged data, not executable 
files, with CompuServe and therefore did not run software from the 
CompuServe network.  Moreover, the mainframe computers at 
CompuServe with which those dumb terminals communicated were 
designed to ensure that the line between users and programmers was 
observed and digitally enforced.123 
Like CompuServe, the U.S. long-distance telephone network of the 
1970s was intended to convey data — in the form of telephone conver-
sations — rather than code between consumers.  In the early 1970s, 
several consumers who were curious about the workings of the tele-
phone network discovered that telephone lines used a tone at a fre-
quency of 2600 Hertz to indicate that they were idle.124  As fortune 
would have it, a toy whistle packaged as a prize in boxes of Cap’n 
Crunch cereal could, when one hole was covered, generate exactly that 
tone.125  People in the know could dial toll-free numbers from their 
home phones, blow the whistle to clear but not disconnect the line, and 
then dial a new, non–toll free number, which would be connected 
without incurring a charge.126  When this imaginative scheme came to 
light, AT&T reconfigured the network so that the 2600-Hertz tone no 
longer controlled it.127  Indeed, the entire notion of in-band signaling 
was eliminated so that controlling the network required something 
other than generating sound into the telephone mouthpiece.  To ac-
complish this reconfiguration, AT&T separated the data and executa-
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ble code in the network — a natural solution in light of the network’s 
centralized control structure and its purpose of carrying data, not host-
ing user programming. 
An understanding of AT&T’s long-distance telephone network and 
its proprietary information service counterparts, then, reveals both the 
benefit and the bane of yesterday’s Internet and today’s generative 
grid: the Internet’s very channels of communication are also channels 
of control.  What makes the Internet so generative is that it can 
transmit both executable code to PCs and data for PC users.  This du-
ality allows one user to access her news feeds while another user cre-
ates a program that aggregates hundreds of news feeds and then pro-
vides that program to millions of other users.  If one separated data 
from the executable code as AT&T or CompuServe did, it would inca-
pacitate the generative power of the Internet. 
CompuServe’s mainframes were the servers, and the consumer 
computers were the clients.  On AT&T’s network, both the caller and 
the call’s recipient were “clients,” with their link orchestrated by a cen-
tralized system of switches — the servers.  On the Internet of both yes-
terday and today, a server is definable only circularly: it is a computer 
that has attached itself to the Internet and made itself available as a 
host to others — no more, no less.128  A generative PC can be used as 
a client or it can be turned into a website that others access.  Lines be-
tween consumer and programmer are self-drawn and self-enforced. 
Given this configuration, it is not surprising that there was little 
momentum for collective action after the Morris worm scare.  The de-
centralized, nonproprietary ownership of the Internet and its com-
puters made it difficult to implement any structural revisions to the 
way they worked.  And more important, it was simply not clear what 
curative steps would not entail drastic and purpose-altering changes to 
the very fabric of the Internet: the notion was so wildly out of propor-
tion to the level of the perceived threat that it was not even broached. 
2.  The PC/Network Grid and a Now-Realized Threat. — In the ab-
sence of significant reform, then, how did the Internet largely dodge 
further bullets?  A thorough answer draws on a number of factors, 
each instructive for the situation in which the grid finds itself today. 
First, the computer scientists were right that the ethos of the time 
frowned upon destructive hacking.129  Even Morris’s worm arguably 
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did more damage than its author had intended, and for all the damage 
it did cause, the worm had no payload other than itself.  Once the 
worm compromised a system, it would have been trivial for Morris to 
have directed the worm, say, to delete as many files as possible.  Like 
Morris’s worm, the overwhelming majority of viruses that followed in 
the 1990s reflected similar authorial restraint130: they infected simply 
for the purpose of spreading further.  Their damage was measured 
both by the effort required to eliminate them and by the burden placed 
upon network traffic as they spread, rather than by the cost of recon-
structing lost files or accounting for sensitive information that had 
been compromised.131 
Second, network operations centers at universities and other insti-
tutions became full-time facilities, with professional administrators 
who more consistently heeded the admonitions to update their patches 
regularly and to scout for security breaches.  Administrators carried 
beepers and were prepared to intervene quickly in the case of a system 
intrusion.  And even though mainstream consumers began connecting 
unsecured PCs to the Internet in earnest by the mid-1990s, their ma-
chines generally used temporary dial-up connections, greatly reducing 
the amount of time per day during which their computers were ex-
posed to security threats and might contribute to the problem. 
Last, there was no commercial incentive to write viruses — they 
were generally written for fun.  Thus, there was no reason that sub-
stantial resources would be invested in creating viruses or in making 
them especially virulent.132 
Each of these factors that created a natural security bulwark has 
been attenuating as powerful networked PCs reach consumers’ hands.  
Universal ethics have become infeasible as the network has become 
ubiquitous: truly anyone who can find a computer and a connection is 
allowed online.  Additionally, consumers have been transitioning to 
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always-on broadband,133 their computers are ever more powerful and 
therefore capable of more mischief should they be compromised, and 
their OSs boast numerous well-known flaws.  Furthermore, many vi-
ruses and worms now have purposes other than simply to spread, in-
cluding purposes that reflect an underlying business incentive.  What 
seemed truly remarkable when discovered is now commonplace: vi-
ruses can compromise a PC and leave it open to later instructions, 
such as commanding it to become its own Internet mail server, sending 
spam to e-mail addresses harvested from the hard disk, or conducting 
web searches to engage in advertising fraud, with the entire process 
typically unnoticeable by the PC’s owner.  In one notable experiment 
conducted in the fall of 2003, a researcher connected to the Internet a 
PC that simulated running an “open proxy,” a condition unintention-
ally common among Internet mail servers.134  Within ten hours, 
spammers had found the computer and had begun attempting to send 
mail through it.135  Sixty-six hours later, the computer had recorded an 
attempted 229,468 distinct messages directed at 3,360,181 would-be re-
cipients.136  (The researcher’s computer pretended to forward the spam 
but in fact threw it away.137) 
CERT Coordination Center statistics reflect this sea change.  The 
organization began documenting the number of attacks against Inter-
net-connected systems — called “incidents” — at its founding in 1988.  
As Figure 1 shows, the increase in incidents since 1997 has been expo-
nential, roughly doubling each year through 2003. 
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FIGURE 1.  NUMBER OF SECURITY INCIDENTS 




















CERT announced in 2004 that it would no longer keep track of this 
figure because attacks have become so commonplace and widespread 
as to be indistinguishable from one another.139 
At the time of the Morris worm, there were an estimated 60,000 
distinct computers, or “hosts,” on the Internet.140  In 2005, the count 
was over 353 million,141 and worldwide PCs in use were estimated at 
almost 900 million.142  This massive set of always-on, powerful PCs, 
many with high-speed Internet connections and run by unskilled users, 
is a phenomenon new to the twenty-first century.  Today’s viruses are 
highly and nearly instantly communicable, capable of sweeping 
through a substantial worldwide population in a matter of hours.143  
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The symptoms may reveal themselves to users instantly or they may 
lie in remission, at the choice of the virus author.  Even uninfected sys-
tems can fall prey to a widespread infection because the spread of a 
virus can disrupt network connectivity and because viruses can be 
programmed to attack a specific network destination by simply access-
ing it repeatedly.  Summed across all infected machines, such a dis-
tributed denial of service attack can disrupt connectivity to even the 
most well-connected and well-defended server. 
Well-crafted worms and viruses routinely infect swaths of Internet-
connected PCs.  In 2004, for example, the Sasser worm infected more 
than half a million computers in three days.144  The Slammer worm in 
January 2003 infected 90% of a particular kind of Microsoft server — 
hindering hundreds of thousands of computers — within fifteen min-
utes.145  The SoBig.F virus was released in August 2003 and quickly 
accounted for over 70% of all e-mail in the world, causing 23.2 million 
virus-laden e-mails to arrive on America Online’s doorstep alone.146  
SoBig.F receded as a threat, in part because its author designed it to 
expire a few weeks later.147  If any of these pieces of malware148 had 
been truly “mal” — for example, programmed to propagate indefi-
nitely, erasing hard drives, transposing numbers randomly inside 
spreadsheets, or adding profanity at random intervals to Word docu-
ments — no security system would have stood in the way of major 
compromise.  Although these examples all occurred on PCs running 
Microsoft Windows, the fundamental problem arises from generativity, 
not from a particular vendor’s security flaw.  Whether running Mac-
OS, Windows, or a flavor of UNIX, a PC that is flexible enough to 
have its code rewritten with the uninformed assent of its user is a PC 
that can be compromised. 
Combine one well-written worm of the sort that can evade firewalls 
and antivirus software with one truly malicious worm writer, and wor-
risome low-level annoyances could spike to more acute effects: check-
in unavailable at some airline counters; no overnight deliveries or 
other forms of package and letter distribution; payroll software unable 
to generate paychecks for millions of workers; or vital records held in 
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medical offices, schools, town halls, and other data repositories elimi-
nated, released, or nefariously altered. 
Government regulators, network designers, and network operators 
have encouraged, or at least tolerated, a generative Internet and a gen-
erative PC.  They have responded with a light touch to a rising num-
ber of problems occasioned by the many possible uses of information 
technology, proceeding carefully with secondary liability regimes or ar-
chitectural mandates in an attempt to eliminate perceived harmful ac-
tivities.  As these activities increase — frustrating legitimate interests 
both on and off the Internet — such restraint will be tested at precisely 
the time that the emerging PC/Internet grid is amenable to behavior-
controlling interventions.  Part IV thus turns to that regulation-
friendly grid and how it has come about after the consummately un-
controlled growth described in Part II. 
IV.  A POSTDILUVIAN INTERNET 
I have thus far described a highly generative PC and network 
combination — one whose components triumphed over their respec-
tive closed competitors in the 1980s and 1990s thanks to their power, 
flexibility, and accessibility to outside development.  Tens of millions of 
people now have always-on Internet access, and that number is grow-
ing briskly.  They can use that access to download new programs or 
participate in new online services, many of which are offered by devel-
opers who have no connection to or special arrangement with PC 
manufacturers, OS developers, or network service providers.  This 
state of affairs is the emerging generative grid.  And despite the inter-
ests of regulators in controlling individual misbehavior and of tech-
nologists in preventing a groundswell of service-compromising mal-
ware, this generative grid appears to be here to stay.  But this 
appearance is deceiving: though the grid is here to stay, its generativity 
is under threat. 
This Part describes fundamental changes to network and PC archi-
tecture that I believe are not only possible, but are also plausible, 
driven or enabled quite naturally by the collective, if unconcerted, 
pressures of the powerful regulators and soon-to-be security-conscious 
consumers described in Part III.  Together, these changes stand to ne-
gate many of the generative features celebrated in Part II.  After Part 
IV describes this emerging postdiluvian Internet, Part V describes 
what might be done about it. 
A.  Elements of a Postdiluvian Internet 
Looking to the grid’s future gives us a sense of what regulators and 
consumers want, as well as when these groups’ interests and views will 
largely align, or at least will not paralyzingly conflict. 2014  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 119:1974  
1.  Information Appliances. — An “information appliance” is one 
that will run only those programs designated by the entity that built or 
sold it.  In the taxonomy of generativity, an information appliance may 
have the leverage and adaptability of a PC, but its accessibility for fur-
ther coding is strictly limited. 
There are already several Internet-aware mainstream information 
appliances.  A flagship example is TiVo, a digital video recorder that 
connects to a user’s cable, satellite, or antenna feed to record television 
programs.149  TiVo also connects to a phone line or Internet connection 
to download program information daily.150  It is thus both a product 
and a service.  Consumers who have TiVo nearly uniformly love it, 
and many say they would not want to watch television without it.151 
The designers of TiVo did not write its software from scratch; they 
implemented it on top of the highly generative GNU/Linux OS.152  
Most TiVo owners do not realize that they have purchased a form of 
PC.  There is no sign that an OS — in the generative sense of some-
thing open to third-party programs — is present.  Users interact with 
TiVo using a remote control,153 and the limitations on TiVo’s use are 
not easy to circumvent.154  Such limitations include the inability to cre-
ate standardized digital output: TiVo’s recorded programs cannot be 
copied over to a PC without TiVo’s own DRM-restricted software.155 
TiVo works as reliably as a traditional appliance because its mak-
ers know, with much greater certainty than most PC manufacturers, 
the uses to which it can be put.  This certainty is good for TiVo and its 
partner hardware manufacturers156 because it gives TiVo complete 
control over the combined product/service that it provides.  It is good 
for consumers because they find TiVo useful and trustworthy.  It is 
also satisfying to regulators because TiVo was designed to prevent con-
tributions to the peer-to-peer problem.  As discussed earlier, TiVo’s re-
corded shows may only be saved to a standard VCR or DVD, or in a 
copy-protected PC format, rather than, as would be trivial for the 
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manufacturer to allow, digitally to a consumer’s PC hard drive in an 
unprotected format or over the Internet to an arbitrary destination.157  
Even though many consumers would no doubt like such a feature, 
TiVo has likely refrained from offering it in part because it has rela-
tionships with content providers158 and in part because of fears of sec-
ondary copyright liability.  The general historical forbearance of Inter-
net regulators notwithstanding, it would be entirely possible under 
Grokster to find distributor-like liability for digital video recorders that 
allow widespread copying and transmission of the programs they re-
cord, especially if such programs were tagged by their originators with 
a flag indicating that they did not want them to be widely shared.159  
The manufacturer of TiVo competitor ReplayTV was sued for permit-
ting this type of retransmission — to any other ReplayTV located on 
the Internet — and for including an automatic commercial skipping 
feature that TiVo lacks.160  ReplayTV filed for bankruptcy before the 
case concluded.161  ReplayTVs made by the successor manufacturer 
lack both of these features,162 and TiVo is in the process of implement-
ing a new feature that will allow content distributors to insist that a 
TiVo not save a recorded program for very long, allowing only time-
shifting of the content by the consumer, not long-term librarying.163 
TiVo heralds growth in Internet-aware appliances that exploit the 
generativity of OSs and networks but that are not themselves genera-
tive to consumers or other end users.  This lack of generativity does 
not alone bespeak a major shift in the fundamentals of the Internet/PC 
grid, though it does perhaps make for some lost collective potential.  
Consumers who might otherwise buy a television-aware PC — and 
who might find themselves pleasantly surprised that it can be adapted 
to uses that they did not contemplate at the time of purchase — in-
stead will buy TiVos.  In turn, there is less incentive for some coders to 
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create new uses because the audience of people who might benefit 
from those uses has decreased.  Indeed, to the extent those uses depend 
on large uptake for their value — as, for example, online auctions do 
— they will be less likely to arise.  The makers of TiVo might decide to 
make TiVo a hub for non-television-related activities — after all, it is a 
PC underneath, and it increasingly has always-on Internet access — 
but such a development would have to take place the way that devel-
opment of new software took place on the proprietary CompuServe 
service: on the initiative of the company itself or through negotiated 
deals with third-party software developers.  Of course, the makers of 
TiVo could choose to update the machine to be able to run third-party 
applications.  In recent months TiVo has taken a very limited step in 
this direction, releasing a software developers’ kit that allows a TiVo 
user to connect to a PC or server and interact in a limited way — es-
sentially adding a web browser to TiVo’s functionality without allow-
ing third parties to reprogram the machine.164 
Similar patterns may be found for other new information appli-
ances.  For example, smartphones are mobile cellular telephones that 
are designed to surf the Internet and handle nontelephonic tasks like 
taking pictures and maintaining calendars and to-do lists.165  S o m e  
smartphones like the Palm Treo are based on general-purpose hand-
held computers and then add telephonic functionality;166 they can run 
applications from third parties, possibly to the chagrin of cellular op-
erators whose service is subject to disruption should Treos be com-
promised by malicious code.  Others, including some phones by Cingu-
lar, run a version of Windows,167 but are configured by the cellular 
carriers who sell them to run only specially “signed” software: custom-
ers cannot simply double-click their way to running software not ap-
proved by the cellular carrier.  Beyond smartphones, some information 
appliances are more closely related to the PC.  For example, the Xbox 
is a powerful video game console produced by Microsoft.  As a gen-
eral-purpose device it has capacity for non-gaming applications, but, 
unlike a PC running Windows, it is generatively far less accessible: 
third-party hardware and software add-ons must be licensed by Mi-
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crosoft, and some portion of profits from their sale must be shared 
with Microsoft as royalties.168 
2.  The Appliancized PC. — The PC is heading in the direction of 
these information appliances.  The first step that OS makers have 
taken as a natural response to threats from viruses and worms is to 
caution users before they run unfamiliar code for the first time.  Users 
have found that they can compromise their PCs simply by visiting the 
wrong webpage, by clicking on executable e-mail attachments, or by 
downloading malicious software.  Microsoft Windows presents a secu-
rity warning when a user tries to run “unknown” software, defined as 
software without a digital certificate recognized by Microsoft.169  In 
the most recent version of Windows (Windows XP), when a user at-
tempts to run such an unknown program, or when one tries to execute 
automatically — perhaps when the user visits a webpage — the user is 
presented with the warning: “The publisher could not be verified.  Are 
you sure you want to run this software?” 
Users in many situations will not know how to answer this ques-
tion reasonably.  Unless the user was not expecting to run any software 
at that instant, she knows only that she wants to run the software so 
long as it works.  How will the consumer know that it works unless 
she tries it?  Frequently, she will assume that the computer ought to 
know the answer better than she does and find herself saying no to 
perfectly good software. 
The consumer-choice solution is thus no panacea for the uninten-
tional downloading of harmful applications.  Consumers confused 
enough to click on a virus-laden e-mail will not likely be deterred by a 
warning box, especially if that warning box appears frequently when 
innocuous but unsigned software is run.  Further, a signature alone 
means nothing: one could sign software with the equivalent of “Donald 
Duck.”170  The user is simply not in the best position to determine 
what software is good and what software is bad.  While not so effec-
tive at solving the fundamental generativity-as-vulnerability problem, 
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an architecture for digital software signing makes it easier for custodi-
ans of computers to appliancize them.  Businesses can readily config-
ure employees’ computers to run only approved applications; so, too, 
can libraries, schools, and parents.  This not only screens out some un-
desirable content, but also locks down the PC for uses that could 
be quite positive, even if not explicitly approved by the machines’ 
custodians. 
For those who buy their own computers and wish to operate them 
without a constant infusion of viruses, the next step of security, beyond 
a generic and ineffective warning, requires specific advice: does the OS 
maker think this software should run?  Software publishers can readily 
offer an architecture through which to answer such a question.  Micro-
soft has long maintained a digital signature program for such software 
as device drivers, which govern the interaction between the OS and 
certain external PC devices like printers, scanners, and cameras.171  
Third-party vendors can write their own drivers and leave them un-
signed, they can sign them on their own authority, or they can submit 
them to Microsoft for approval.  In the third case, Microsoft tests the 
drivers and, if they pass Microsoft’s test, signs them as approved for 
use.172 
In some respects, this sort of testing and approval is a positive de-
velopment for consumers.  Too often, PC users find their machines 
consumed by viruses and are baffled that such infection is not covered 
by the PC manufacturer’s or OS vendor’s warranties.  The OS vendor 
can address this concern by promising some form of assistance with 
OS problems, so long as the consumer sets the computer not to run un-
signed or unapproved software.  An OS maker like Microsoft can also 
benefit because it is uniquely positioned to offer this value-added ser-
vice, one that gives it first-order gatekeeping ability over every piece of 
software running on its machines.  As it does with an information ap-
pliance like the Xbox,173 Microsoft could decide to charge a fee to ap-
prove third-party software were it to revisit something akin to a brief, 
informally stated, and quickly disavowed possibility of collecting a 
“vig,” or small tax, on “every transaction over the Internet that uses 
Microsoft’s technology.”174  Alternatively, the OS maker could offer its 
approval for free, still benefiting as kingmaker and gaining helpful in-
fluence over the PC experiences a user is likely to have by assuring 
some minimum quality control.  An independent software maker 
might chafe at having to obtain such approval, but it could always 
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choose to forgo approval and reduce the number of machines on which 
its software will run when users accept default settings designed to 
block unknown software. 
To understand the full implications of these potential solutions — 
and why they are troubling — it helps to juxtapose this developing ar-
chitecture with another new feature in OSs that is possible now that 
networking is so ubiquitous: automatic updating.175  This new feature, 
which appears in the latest Microsoft and Apple OSs and in many in-
dividual pieces of software, takes account of the fact that more and 
more PCs have always-on broadband Internet connections.  From the 
moment the computer is first connected to the Internet, the feature is 
enabled for some software.  For others, including Windows XP, the 
feature is off, but the computer prompts the user to turn it on.176  With 
automatic updating, the computer regularly checks — typically daily 
— for updates from the OS publisher and from the makers of any 
software installed on the PC.  At first blush, this function is innocuous 
enough; it takes advantage of the networkability and adaptability of 
the PC to obtain the most recent security patches as they become 
available.  Because it does not rely on consumer vigilance, this devel-
opment solves some of the consumer maintenance problems noted as 
early as 1988, during the Morris worm incident, when many computer 
flaws went “unpatched.” 
So far Apple and Microsoft install automatically only security-
related updates that they deem “critical”; updates to the “regular” func-
tioning of the OS or auxiliary applications still require the consumer’s 
approval.  Many other makers of stand-alone software use automatic 
updating far more liberally, and there is no technical limit on what 
changes to a PC they can effect.  They might not only update them-
selves, but also use the feature to download a small patch to other 
vendors’ software, to install entirely new software, to upgrade the OS, 
or to eliminate installed software.  Thus, the security benefits of auto-
matic updating may well fail to justify the new vulnerabilities it cre-
ates, especially for producers of more obscure pieces of software whose 
update servers might be more easily compromised by third parties 
than the “bunkerized” versions run by OS makers.  But whether or not 
it addresses security concerns, automatic updating opens the door to 
an utter transformation of the way the Internet grid works. 
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With automatic updating, the OS and attendant applications be-
come services rather than products.  This transformation holds appeal 
for software makers, who can request or require consumers to sub-
scribe to regular updates, much as those who purchase antivirus soft-
ware are asked to subscribe annually to virus definition updates after 
a one-year grace period.  Further, such updates help reduce software 
piracy: if a consumer does not validate his or her copy of the software 
or OS, the manufacturer can deactivate the software from a distance 
or can configure it to cease functioning if not properly renewed.177 
Automatic updating works in concert with appliancization, allow-
ing manufacturers to see when their software has been hacked or al-
tered — and to shut down or reinstall the original OS when they have.  
Exactly this happened with the Hughes DirecTV satellite receiver in-
formation appliance.  Just before the Super Bowl in 2001, consumers 
who had hacked their DirecTV receivers to receive smartcard access 
found their receivers suddenly no longer working: the satellite had 
broadcast not only programming for people to watch, but program-
ming for the receiver to obey.178  The receiver checked for particular 
hacks and, if they were found, self-destructed, rendering the affected 
cards entirely useless.  By some reports, the last few computer bytes of 
the hacked smartcards were rewritten to read “Game Over.”179 
Automatically updating software on PCs is becoming more com-
mon at the same time as the Internet itself becomes a host for highly 
controlled software.  The emergence of the PC/Internet grid makes it 
easier for applications to be developed to run on remote servers rather 
than on the PC itself.  A PC or information appliance equipped with 
only a web browser can now access a range of services — a develop-
ment variously known as application streaming, web services, and 
Web  2.0.180  On one view, this development is generatively neutral, 
merely shifting the locus of generative software writing to a server on 
the Internet rather than on the PC itself — perhaps even avoiding the 
generative damage caused by PC lockdown.  This shift, however, un-
dermines distributed PC processing power for novel peer-to-peer ap-
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plications.181  It also carries many, but not all, of the drawbacks of 
automatic updating.  From a security standpoint, a service updated at 
one location on the Internet may be much less likely to interfere with 
the user’s enjoyment of a service offered elsewhere by another pro-
vider — unlike an automatic update by one PC application that can 
harm a concurrent PC application or disrupt the overall operation of 
the PC.  However, this very isolation of services can also prevent gen-
erative building of software on other software.182  S o m e  I n t e r n e t -
hosted services maintain standardized interfaces to user data to permit 
outside development.  For example, Google has so far allowed inde-
pendent software developers to create “mash-ups” with their own vir-
tual pushpins superimposed on Google’s maps.183  Google can with-
draw this permission at any time and shut off the underlying service 
facilitating the mash-ups, keeping dependent generative applications in 
the realm of whimsy because any long-term or commercial develop-
ment on such terms would be foolhardy.184 
B.  Implications of a Postdiluvian Internet: 
More Regulability, Less Generativity 
Consumers deciding between security-flawed generative PCs and 
safer but more limited information appliances (or appliancized PCs) 
may consistently undervalue the benefits of future innovation (and 
therefore of generative PCs).  The benefits of future innovation are dif-
ficult to perceive in present-value terms, and few consumers are likely 
to factor into their purchasing decisions the history of unexpected in-
formation technology innovation that promises so much more just 
around the corner. 
From the regulators’ point of view, automatic updating presents 
new gatekeeping opportunities.  Updates can be and have been used 
by manufacturers not only to add functionality, but also to take it 
away, at times apparently because of legal concerns.  For example, an 
earlier version of Apple’s iTunes software permitted users to stream 
their music on the Internet, without permitting them to copy each oth-
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ers’ music permanently.185  Apple subsequently thought better of the 
feature, and in a later automatic update trimmed iTunes to permit 
streaming only to those on one’s local network.186  This capability has 
considerable implications for the content management and infringe-
ment problems discussed in Part III.  At the time of Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,187 it was no doubt difficult to 
imagine impounding consumers’ VCRs as a remedy, should VCRs 
have been found instruments of contributory copyright infringement.  
But if Sony could have reprogrammed consumers’ VCRs at a distance, 
at the direction of content owners and regulators, such a remedy might 
have been very tempting.  Similar inspiration prompted a California 
district court to shape the way the Napster service functioned by or-
dering the company to make efforts to filter out unauthorized copy-
righted files from its centralized directory of user-supplied offerings.188 
Professor Randal Picker sees automatic updating as transforming 
the information technology landscape and suggests that regulators 
should indeed exploit it.189  For example, in the copyright context, he 
believes that a software author who builds automatic updating into a 
product that could facilitate infringement ought to have “a duty of on-
going design to reduce noninfringing use.”190  For those who fail to 
build in automatic updating in the first instance, Professor Picker sug-
gests a “hard use test” designed to make it legally risky to release po-
tentially infringing software without retaining programming control.191  
Professor Picker’s argument is straightforward enough: once it be-
comes easy to revise distributed products to make them less harmful 
(in the eyes of regulators), why not encourage such revisions?  But Pro-
fessor Picker fails to take into account the generative loss from compel-
ling software originators to retain exclusive control. 
A current example is illustrative: MP3 players, including the iPod, 
are increasingly being used for radio-like broadcasts.  Through so-
called “podcasting,” an owner of an MP3 player can lawfully 
download, for listening purposes, a number of selected programs from 
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the Internet at large.192  The iTunes streaming feature could have been 
a significant contributor to the popular uptake of podcasting because it 
could have allowed people to share their favorite broadcasts widely.  
But because Apple withdrew the feature, its potential impact cannot 
be known.  Although Apple’s withdrawal was voluntary, many more 
generative developments might be lost as a result of legally compelled 
restrictions on such features. 
Worse, Professor Picker’s solution would be difficult to apply to 
group-written open-source software.193  A regulatory judgment in fa-
vor of software as service would, if not carefully crafted, punish decen-
tralized development processes, which in turn might reduce or elimi-
nate entire categories of information technology innovation. 
Furthermore, the logic of Professor Picker’s argument for imposing 
gatekeeping responsibilities need not stop at a software author’s own 
products.  Consider the consequences if OS makers were held respon-
sible for all applications running on their systems.  For example, 
DeCSS, a program that decrypts DVDs, has been found to be an illegal 
circumvention tool under section 1201 of the DMCA.194  Under threat 
of liability or direct government regulation, it would take little techni-
cal effort for Microsoft, using exactly the technologies that antivirus 
vendors use to screen for and eliminate malware, to send an update to 
its OS customers that would prevent DeCSS from running.  Indeed, 
any vendor of antivirus software with automatically updating defini-
tions could be so pressured. 
To be sure, the potential for new uses does not always militate 
against trying to eliminate real infringements.  But the advent of soft-
ware as service shifts generative power away from the broad audiences 
at the edges of information technology deployment and toward the 
center — toward professional software authors constrained by ven-
dors, regulators, and private litigants who can influence them.195  This 
shift will be unfortunate if it tends to frustrate the vast creativity and 
energy of “edge” contributors of the sort described in Part II.196 
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Software as service may be inevitable for some markets as the net-
worked grid becomes reliable and fast enough to warrant moving code 
away from the productized desktop.  However, consumers may consis-
tently undervalue the unanticipated future uses of open PCs, creating 
a degree of market failure.  Further, the generative history of the 
Internet and the PC suggests that we should hesitate before we pres-
sure software developers to include automatic updating and use it for 
regulatory purposes. 
The “third strand” cyberlaw scholars, who first raised concerns 
about an era of trusted systems in the mid-1990s, foresaw software 
that would refuse to abide by a user’s desires if those desires exceeded 
the permissions built into the technology.  Such software exists, but as 
Part III explains, its controls are structurally weak when implemented 
on generative PCs.  So long as the user can run unrestricted software 
and can use an open network to obtain cracked copies of the locked-
down content, trusted systems provide thin protection.  For instance, 
Microsoft’s Windows Media Player contains a powerful rights man-
agement system, but it will still play content stripped of protective 
tags.  Even if it should cease to do so — instead playing only certified 
content — users could still install third-party players that ignore such 
restrictions. 
United States lawmakers recognized this loophole in 2002, propos-
ing the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act197 
(CBDTPA).  The Act would have set in motion a process by which 
technology makers would, among themselves, develop standards for 
flagging digital content restrictions and then be compelled to write 
software that would respect those restrictions.198  It would apply to 
any “digital media device,” meaning: 
[A]ny hardware or software that — 
    (A) reproduces copyrighted works in digital form; 
    (B) converts copyrighted works in digital form into a form whereby 
the images and sounds are visible or audible; or 
    (C) retrieves or accesses copyrighted works in digital form and trans-
fers or makes available for transfer such works to hardware or software 
described in subparagraph (B).199 
If technology makers could not agree on a standard, the FCC was to 
set one for them.200 
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Had the CBDTPA passed, it would have been nothing short of a 
breathtaking intervention.  The proposal was in fact so drastic that it 
appeared to be a mere warning shot — not actually intended to be-
come law — by the legislators who proposed it.  But the substantive 
insight represented by the sweep of the CBDTPA rings true: if trusted 
systems are truly to restrict access to content, the open and the closed 
cannot coexist.  The idea behind the CBDTPA was not simply to regu-
late the way that software restricted what people could do, but to 
regulate the way that OSs restricted what software could do and in 
turn the way that hardware could restrict what OSs could do. 
The security- and market-driven phenomena that this Part de-
scribes point to a technology configuration that already accomplishes 
many of the goals of the CBDTPA.  Unlike the CBDTPA, these phe-
nomena are not fiats to be grafted onto a vibrant, resistant market-
place.  They are the marketplace, representing a sum across the tech-
nology and publishing industries, governments, and consumers.  In 
essence, they point to a license to code that is issued by mainstream 
software makers but can be shaped by governments. 
Such a license may not be hard to obtain.  Like a driver’s license or 
a cosmetologist’s license that vouches for the basic training and iden-
tity of the holder, a license to code would exist, at first, simply to re-
quire a verifiable identity behind the production of software.  It could 
be held by a software author to indicate permission to make new 
works and could also apply to each item of software itself so that regu-
lators could revoke the license of individual works.  Further, the crea-
tor could be identified easily and held accountable for creating a virus 
or for negligently allowing his or her identity to be stolen. 
New software writers might find users skeptical of running their 
software at first.  Like new traders on the auction site eBay, new pro-
ducers would have to prove their worth among daring consumers, 
slowly building a reputation for trustworthiness.  Alternatively, new 
producers could submit the software for testing, such as the sort of 
testing that Microsoft requires for those who want their device drivers 
to be signed or that some smartphone makers require before allowing 
programs to run on their devices. 
Should approved software later turn out to enable undesirable be-
havior, a government could demand that an OS maker treat it as a vi-
rus and revoke its license — or even the license of its author.  Different 
governments might make different judgments about the software and 
thus could ask OS makers to block the offending software only on PCs 
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toward free OSs like Linux201 — to save money and to avoid a sense of 
control by American OS firms — need not produce generativity if it is 
thought to interfere with government content-filtering objectives.  The 
tools to lock down PCs might be implemented using free or proprie-
tary code, and a consumer market of appliancized PCs or information 
appliances would make it much harder to circumvent censorship be-
cause third-party code giving rise to new, unfiltered overlay networks 
could not be run readily.  A focus on generativity, rather than on free 
versus proprietary software,202 illuminates the implications for political 
censorship in one place flowing from seemingly unrelated security 
measures taken in another. 
So far, this Part has discussed reasons why consumers, OS makers, 
and regulators might appreciate a world in which the PC is more 
locked down in certain ways — ways that strike at the heart of its 
generativity.  To be sure, there is no basis on which to insist flatly that 
any tradeoff between regulability and generativity should favor the lat-
ter.  But this is a false dichotomy if we can make the grid more secure 
without sacrificing its essential generative characteristics.  Making 
progress on the security problem is difficult because the distributed na-
ture of the Internet and individual ownership of PCs do not induce 
participants to internalize their negative security externalities.  As Part 
V discusses, ISPs are not held economically accountable when their 
subscribers’ computers fall victim to viruses.  Similarly, individual us-
ers may not care if their compromised machines cause trouble for 
other, faraway users.  Locking down the PC, although attractive from 
a regulatory point of view, is undesirable because of its effect on inno-
vation: technical innovation will slow as third parties are squeezed out 
of the development cycle, and intellectual and artistic innovation will 
slow as some of the technical innovations forestalled are quite possibly 
ones that would enhance valuable expressive activities. 
The existence of a widely distributed, multipurpose PC inviting 
third-party contribution permits innovation arbitrage, whereby firms 
that are slow to invent or improve information appliances find them-
selves leapfrogged by entrepreneurial PC software programmers with 
less invested in the status quo.  For example, the free Internet teleph-
ony services offered by such PC applications as Skype and audio-
enabled instant messenger programs serve as benchmarks for applian-
cized telephone services that connect to the Internet through wi-fi 
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networks to complete calls when possible, saving money by avoiding 
traditional telephone networks.  Without the ability to distribute their 
software to PCs, the innovators behind Skype and its siblings would 
find it costly to establish themselves in the marketplace, competitive 
pressures on incumbents would ease, and innovation would slow.   
Thus, generative PCs and information appliances can complement 
each other — the former providing a fertile soil for innovation, the lat-
ter providing a stable, user-friendly instantiation of innovation.  Even 
a firm like Skype can start small and then, due to its success on PCs, 
secure funding to jump into the appliance business.203  Without gen-
erative PCs, the engine of innovation would be greatly weakened.204 
V.  HOW TO TEMPER A POSTDILUVIAN INTERNET 
Part II of this Article describes ways in which the Internet and PC 
developed among hobbyists and amateurs as much as through tradi-
tional firms, thanks to the technologies’ generativity.  The technolo-
gies’ adaptability, ease of mastery, and accessibility meant that any 
number of communities, responding to a variety of needs with a vari-
ety of business models, could produce new applications and distribute 
them freely.  Many of these applications themselves enable creative 
expression and exchange, resulting in recursive generativity: open, 
adaptable OSs and networks provide the basis for new tools that are 
themselves open and adaptable for creative expression. 
The emergence of broadband has meant that these applications can 
run either locally or remotely and still be instantly accessible.  Part III 
of this Article describes how disruptive uses of Internet and PC gen-
erativity, in particular cybersecurity problems, stand to raise alarm and 
ignite a significant reaction.  Part IV sketches how, paradoxically, the 
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very generative avenues opened by the merging of the PC and Internet 
into a grid include the means by which much greater control can and 
likely will be asserted. 
The worst aspects of this future ought to be blunted even though 
they will benefit important stakeholders: The postdiluvian Internet 
creates new opportunities for regulators.  It accords with, or is identi-
cal to, the plans of many technology industry firms.  In addition, it is 
genuinely premised on new conveniences for consumers, allowing their 
desired activities to take place more reliably, though at the expense of 
unquantifiable future opportunities. 
To evaluate the different paths information technology might take, 
we must bear in mind key contributors to its success: those who are 
creative and are inspired to express that creativity, whether through 
producing new code or code-enabled art.  Amateurs, who produced 
applications that others overlooked, played a vital role in the rise of 
the Internet and the PC that Part II chronicles.  In this sense, of 
course, “amateurs” are those who do what they do because they love to 
do it.  The availability of tools through which amateurs could express 
creativity meant that code was written by parties other than those who 
had chosen lives of professional codewriting.  Today, thanks to net-
worked information technology and the recursively generative code 
produced in large part by amateurs, art can be produced and shared 
by people other than professional artists, citizens can engage in far-
ranging dialogues with others whom they would not otherwise encoun-
ter, and people can work together from the four corners of the globe to 
produce intellectual projects of social and economic significance.205 
The most important opportunities for such creativity ought to be 
retained as the Internet evolves.  But this will require those who sup-
port creative communities to make an important concession.  They 
will have to face the reality that a free and open Internet, including 
open PCs distributed among tens of millions of consumers, is simply 
not possible unless the most pressing demands of countervailing regu-
latory forces are satisfied.  It is now an opportune time for thoughtful 
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interventions in law and code.  Matters are still in flux, and no stake-
holder is too invested in any of the most locked-down versions of the 
postdiluvian Internet.  Intervention can preserve and maybe even en-
hance generativity while making necessary progress toward stability. 
This Part sketches ways in which current thinking by cyberlaw 
scholars on these issues is perhaps too constrained.  It also describes 
some specific projects that could help solve some of the Internet’s most 
pressing problems with as little constriction of its generative capacities 
as possible. 
A.  Refining Principles of Internet Design and Governance 
1.  Superseding the End-to-End Argument. — Saltzer, Reed, and 
Clark’s 1984 paper on end-to-end design purported only to stipulate a 
good heuristic for keeping networks simple.206  Since then, the notion 
of end-to-end neutrality has been offered as a normative ideal of an 
Internet free from internal filtering.207  Many cyberlaw scholars have 
taken up end-to-end as a battle cry for Internet freedom,208 invoking it 
to buttress arguments about the ideological impropriety of filtering 
Internet traffic.  Although these arguments are powerful, and although 
end-to-end neutrality in both its technical and political incarnations 
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has been a crucial touchstone for Internet development, end-to-end 
does not fully capture the overall project of maintaining generativity, 
which more fundamentally expresses the values that attracted cyber-
law scholars to end-to-end in the first place. 
According to end-to-end theory, placing control and intelligence at 
the edges of a network maximizes network flexibility and user 
choice.209  The political implication of this view — that end-to-end de-
sign preserves user freedom — depends on an increasingly unreliable 
presumption: whoever runs a machine at a given network endpoint 
can readily choose how the machine will work.  For example, in re-
sponse to a network teeming with viruses and spam, network engi-
neers suggest more bandwidth (to make invisible the transmission of 
“deadweights” like viruses and spam) and better protection at user 
endpoints, rather than interventions by ISPs closer to the middle of the 
network.210  But consumers are not well positioned to maintain their 
machines painstakingly against attack, leading them to prefer the 
locked-down PCs described in Part IV.  Those who favor end-to-end 
principles because they favor generativity must realize that failure to 
take action at the network level may close some parts of the grid be-
cause consumers may demand, and PC manufacturers may provide, 
locked-down endpoint environments that promise security and stabil-
ity with minimum user upkeep.  Some may embrace a categorical end-
to-end approach anyway: even in a world of locked-down PCs, there 
will no doubt remain non-mainstream generative computing platforms 
for professional technical audiences.  But this view is too narrow.  We 
ought to see the possibilities and benefits of PC generativity made 
available to everyone, including the millions of people who obtain PCs 
for current rather than future uses, but who end up delighted at the 
new uses to which they can put their machines. 
Put simply, complete fidelity to end-to-end may cause users to em-
brace the digital equivalent of gated communities.  Gated communities 
offer safety and stability to residents and a manager to complain to 
when something goes wrong.  But from a generative standpoint, digital 
gated communities are prisons.  Their confinement is less than obvious 
because what they block is generative possibility: the ability of outsid-
ers to offer code and services to users, giving users and producers an 
opportunity to influence the future without a regulator’s permission.  
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If digital gated communities become the norm, highly skilled Internet 
users of the sort who predominated in the mid-1980s will still be able 
to enjoy generative computing on platforms that are not locked down, 
but the rest of the public will not be brought along for the ride.  For 
those using locked-down endpoints, the freedom in the middle of the 
network is meaningless. 
Thus, strict loyalty to end-to-end neutrality should give way to a 
new generativity principle, a rule that asks that modifications to the 
PC/Internet grid be made when they will do the least harm to its gen-
erative possibilities.  Under such a principle, for example, it may be 
preferable in the medium term to screen out viruses through ISP-
operated network gateways rather than through constantly updated 
PCs.211  Although such network screening theoretically opens the door 
to additional filtering that may be undesirable, this risk should be bal-
anced against the very real risks to generativity inherent in PCs oper-
ated as services rather than products. 
This generativity principle suggests at least two ways in which we 
might fundamentally reconceptualize the map of cyberspace.  First, we 
must bridge the divide between those concerned with network connec-
tivity and protocols, on the one hand, and those concerned with PC 
design, on the other — a divide that end-to-end unfortunately encour-
ages.  Such modularity in stakeholder competence and purview was 
originally a useful and natural extension of the Internet’s hourglass ar-
chitecture: it meant that network experts did not have to be PC ex-
perts and vice versa, just as the OS-application divide in the corre-
sponding PC hourglass means that application developers need not 
know the ins and outs of PC peripherals and networking.  But this di-
vision of responsibilities, which works so well for technical design, is 
crippling our ability to think through the trajectory of applied infor-
mation technology.  Now that the PC and the Internet are so inextri-
cably intertwined, it is not enough for network engineers to worry only 
about network openness and assume that the endpoints can take care 
of themselves.  It is abundantly clear that endpoints simply cannot. 
Second, “middle” and “endpoint” are no longer subtle enough to 
capture the important features of the Internet/PC landscape.  It re-
mains correct that from a network standpoint, protocol designs and 
the ISPs that implement them are the “middle” of the network, as dis-
tinct from PC “endpoints.”  But the true import of a vernacular of 
“middle” and “endpoint” for policy purposes relates to individuals’ 
power to control their experiences on the network.  If consumers can 
no longer exercise meaningful control over their PC endpoints, instead 
ceding such control to government or corporate authority such as an 
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OS maker or a handful of security vendors, then the PCs become 
driven by a “middle” and their identities as endpoints diminish.  Even 
today, consumers might not want or have the ability to fine-tune their 
PCs, and the taxonomy of generativity would say that such fine-tuning 
is not possible because the PCs are not easy for a mass audience to 
master even though they remain leveraged and adaptable.  But there 
are a variety of methods by which PCs can compensate for the diffi-
culty of mastery, only some of which require centralized control.  For 
example, users might be able to choose from an array of proxies — 
perhaps Microsoft, Ralph Nader, or a public interest organization — 
for guidance on decisions about PC configuration.  Now that the net-
work’s endpoints are controllable by faraway entities, abandoning the 
end-to-end debate’s simplistic divide between middle and endpoint 
will enable us to identify and respond better to the emerging threats to 
the Internet’s generativity. 
2.  Reframing the Internet Governance Debate. — Since the mid-
1990s, an intense but misguided debate has raged over Internet gov-
ernance.  Those who care about the Internet’s future are unduly occu-
pied with domain names and the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN), the nonprofit organization chartered 
to administer top-level domain name policy.  The existence of ICANN 
has proved a focus for debates about Internet governance for the cir-
cular reason that ICANN is an organization administering a particular 
— and quite limited — part of Internet functionality.  The issues at 
stake in domain name assignment are real, but the focus on such dis-
putes and on the governance of ICANN is myopic in relation to the 
threats posed by undue restriction of the Internet’s generativity. 
At the other extreme is the overbroad focus of the World Summit 
on the Information Society, a United Nations project that took place 
from  2003 to 2005.212  The World Summit included narrow debates 
about domain name management, but it also covered the larger di-
lemma of the global digital divide: how to ensure Internet access to as 
many people and peoples as possible.213  This cause is truly worthy, 
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but it makes Internet governance seem like merely a facet of interna-
tional development policy. 
Just as Internet architects should be encouraged to apply network 
design principles to PCs as PCs develop, groups engaged with issues of 
Internet governance should take note of the ways in which the Inter-
net/PC grid is developing and grapple directly with how to maintain 
generativity.  To proceed assuming that the primary challenge for 
Internet governance is narrowly one of managing administrative func-
tions or is broadly one of deploying the network to additional people is 
to overlook the most important questions facing the Internet’s future. 
Part IV argues that OS makers or security firms may block the de-
ployment of individual PC applications on behalf of PC users who 
crave security, creating broader bottlenecks to application deployment 
by anyone other than centralized kingmakers.  The puzzle, then, is 
how to avoid these bottlenecks, whether coming from government or 
from private code-filtering schemes, while conceding that PC users can 
no longer be expected to exercise meaningful choice about code with-
out help.  A worthy Internet governance project to retain consumer 
choice without creating a new bottleneck could take the form of a 
grassroots campaign or public interest organization with participation 
from Internet architects.  This project could set up a technical archi-
tecture to label applications and fragments of executable code, coupled 
with an organization to apply such labels nondiscriminatorily.  Alter-
natively, the project could establish a distributed architecture by which 
the individual decisions about whether to run a given application, and 
the subsequent results, could serve as advice to others contemplating 
whether to run such code.  The history of the Internet is seasoned with 
successful organizations devoted to such ends even though ideological 
views and regulatory agendas are often embedded in technical deci-
sions.214  Public interest “underwriters’ laboratories” for the Internet 
would reduce consumer demand for evaluations by OS makers or 
ISPs.  Precisely because the lines separating viruses, spyware, poorly 
written software, and flat rent extraction by software authors are so 
blurry, they are best adjudicated using the sorts of quasi-public 
mechanisms that have served Internet development in the past.  The 
alternative is to see such power accrete in a handful of private firms 
with incentives to become gatekeepers for purposes other than security. 
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Perhaps most promising, the Internet grid itself can support the 
immediate collection and collation of useful information, which would 
then be passed from one PC to another, permitting PC users to make 
informed decisions about code.  Tools can be developed to provide 
members of the general Internet public with simple but powerful in-
formation about the code they encounter.  A tool of this sort could be a 
dashboard displaying information such as how many other computers 
in the world were running a candidate piece of software and whether 
their users were on average more or less satisfied with their computers 
than those who did not run it.  A gauge that showed that a piece of 
software was nonexistent last week but is now unusually popular 
might signal to a cautious PC user to wait before running it.  Professor 
Jean Camp and others have sketched the beginnings of a system col-
lecting explicit user judgments about code.215  Such explicit user 
judgments — perhaps unreliable because many users do not know 
how their PCs work — could be augmented with automatically gener-
ated demographics, such as how often a PC reboots or generates pop-
up windows, or implicit judgments that inexpert users might generate 
more reliably, such as how satisfied users are with their machines.  By 
aggregating across thousands or millions of users, the dashboard can 
isolate and display the effects of a single piece of code. 
3.  Recognizing Interests in Tension with Generativity. — Those 
who have made the broad case for Internet freedom — who believe 
that nearly any form of control should be resisted — ought to be pre-
pared to make concessions.  Not only are many of the interests that 
greater control seeks to protect indeed legitimate, but an Internet and 
PCs entirely open to new and potentially dangerous applications at the 
click of a mouse are also simply not suited to widespread consumer 
use.  If the inevitable reaction to such threats is to be stopped, its un-
derlying policy concerns must in part be met. 
There was a time in the Internet’s development during which it 
made sense to eschew modalities of control because the network was 
experimental and because the harm that could be brought about by its 
misuse was limited.  The network, after all, only carried bits.  One 
might compare it to a hypothetical highly generative children’s chemis-
try set, which would be adaptable and could be leveraged: it would 
contain chemicals that could accomplish a variety of tasks, with small 
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quantities adding up to big results if the user so desired.  It would also 
be highly accessible: children would be able to learn how to use it.  
But such generativity would have a manifest downside risk: a chemi-
cal accident could be dangerous to the child or even to the entire 
neighborhood.216  A malicious child — or adult, for that matter — 
could wreak greater havoc as the set’s generativity grew.  The same 
principle, of course, applies to gene splicing kits, atom smashers, and 
many of the power tools at a local hardware store. 
At an abstract level, then, one might ask: for a given technology, 
how much generativity can be maintained in the face of concessions to 
its threats?  Knowing only that one technology is in the field of com-
puter or information science and another is in the field of, say, physics, 
might be enough to imply that there ought to be room for more gen-
erativity for the former than for the latter because the risks of harm — 
particularly physical harm — from misuse or abuse of the former are 
structurally likely to be lower.  The worst examples of the harm caused 
by wayward uses of applications and networks — including uses for 
invasion of privacy, financial scams, defamation, and copyright in-
fringement — are less physical than that which could be caused by 
wayward uses of fertilizer, explosives, and petri dish cultures.217  With 
generative technologies in the physical sciences, on the one hand, the 
good applications may be much more identifiable ex ante and the 
harmful ones more diffuse, suggesting there is less to be gained from 
maintaining universal generativity.  With the Internet, on the other 
hand, truly harmful applications are the known exceptions to be 
carved out from the universe of potential applications the technology 
enables.  At the very least, then, if individual harms can be largely 
identified and then prevented or rectified by narrow interventions, 
these interventions would be preferable to undermining the generative 
nature of the PC and the Internet. 
Now that the Internet is no longer experimental, an intuition that 
“it’s only bits” is not so compelling.  The degree of openness suited to, 
say, 1988 — when an inculcation of “professional ethics” among Inter-
net users was thought to be the appropriate way to deal with virus 
writers218 — does not suit the present day. 
Some of the parties best suited to solve the problems of viruses, 
privacy invasion, spam, and copyright infringement may be sitting on 
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the sidelines, unmotivated to help, and preferring an Internet that is 
entirely open because they can defend themselves from the Internet’s 
worst harms thanks to their technological sophistication.  If they do 
not contribute their creativity and effort to these problems, however, 
solutions less sensitive to generativity are all too likely to come about. 
4.  “Dual Machine” Solutions. — Part IV suggests that consumers, 
rightly fearful of security vulnerabilities latent in the generative Inter-
net/PC grid, will demand a future in which locked-down information 
appliances predominate over generative PCs.  One may seek the best 
of both worlds, however, by creating both generativity and security 
within a single device.  To accomplish this compromise, we might 
build PCs with physical switches on the keyboard — switching be-
tween “red” and “green.”219  A PC switched to red mode would be akin 
to today’s PCs: it would be capable of running any software it encoun-
tered.  This mode would maximize user choice, allowing participation 
in unanticipated applications, such as PC-to-PC telephony, whose 
value in part depends on uptake by other users.  Such a configuration 
would retain a structural vulnerability to worms and viruses, however.  
Hence the availability of green mode, by which the computer’s proces-
sor would be directed to a different OS and different data within the 
same hardware.  In green mode, the computer might run only ap-
proved or vetted software — less interesting, but much more reliable.  
The consumer could then switch between the two modes, attempting 
to ensure that valuable or sensitive data is created and stored in green 
mode and leaving red mode for experimentation.  A crude division 
such as this has the benefit of being eminently understandable to the 
consumer — just as a driver can understand putting a sport utility ve-
hicle into all-wheel drive for off-roading — while retaining much of 
the leverage and adaptability of today’s PC. 
But such PCs give rise to new problems.  For example, ISPs might 
offer a lower rate for connecting a green PC and a higher rate for a red 
one — presuming the green to be less burdensome for customer service 
and less amenable to network abuse.  Corporate environments might 
offer only green PCs and thus limit the audience for available innova-
tion.  Or the green PC might be so restrictively conceived that most 
users would find it unpalatable and would thus continue to choose be-
tween traditional PCs and vendor-specific information appliances.   
Even to hypothesize a green PC is to ask that some way be found to 
determine which software is suitable for use on an open PC and which 
is not.  A PC running multiple virtual machines220 is a promising ave-
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nue, but it raises many of the same sorts of problems that a locked-
down PC would encounter, although solutions to these problems might 
lie in a distributed, public-interest effort to sort red applications from 
green ones. 
B.  Policy Interventions 
1.  Enabling Greater Opportunity for Direct Liability. — As the ca-
pacity to inflict damage increases with the Internet’s reach and with 
the number of valuable activities reliant upon it, the imperatives to 
take action will also increase.  Intermediaries will be called to super-
vise because they provide a service capable of filtering user behavior.  
Preemptive reductions in PC or Internet generativity may also arise as 
it becomes easier to implement such changes over the grid. 
One way to reduce pressure on institutional and technological 
gatekeepers is to make direct responsibility more feasible.  Forthcom-
ing piecemeal solutions to problems such as spam take this approach.  
ISPs are working with makers of major PC e-mail applications to pro-
vide for forms of sender authentication.221  A given domain can, using 
public key encryption tools, authenticate that it is indeed the source of 
e-mail attributed to it.  With Microsoft’s Sender ID or something like 
it, e-mail purporting — but not proving — to be from a user at ya-
hoo.com can be filtered as spam so easily that it will no longer be 
worthwhile to send.  This regime will hold ISPs more accountable for 
the e-mail they permit their networks to originate because they will 
find themselves shunned by other ISPs if they permit excessive 
anonymous spam.  This opportunity for more direct liability reduces 
the pressure on those processing incoming e-mail — both the desig-
nated recipients and their ISPs — to resort to spam filtration heuristics 
that may unintentionally block legitimate e-mail.222 
The same principle can be applied to individuals’ uses of the Inter-
net that are said to harm legally protected interests.  From the point of 
view of generativity, music industry lawsuits against individual file 
sharers inflict little damage on the network and the PC themselves, 
even if they are bad policy because the underlying substantive law 
demarcating the protected interest is itself ill-advised — as I believe it 
is.  The Internet’s future may be brighter if technical processes are re-
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fined to permit easier identification of Internet users, alongside legal 
processes — and perhaps technical limitations — to ensure that such 
identification is only made with good cause. 
As discussed in section II.C, many Internet consumers have em-
braced wi-fi, and the wireless routers default to sharing the connection 
with anyone nearby who has a PC configured with a wireless antenna.  
Consumers may not intend to open their networks, but they carry gen-
erative benefits for those nearby without their own Internet access.223  
Usage by others does not typically impede the original consumer’s en-
joyment of broadband, but should outsiders use that connection, say, 
to send viruses or to pirate copyrighted files, the original consumer 
could be blamed when the Internet connection is traced.224  As such 
examples arise and become well-known, consumers will seek to cut off 
others’ access to their surplus network resources, and the manufactur-
ers of wireless routers will change the default to “closed.”  If, however, 
genuine individual identity can be confirmed in appropriate circum-
stances, wi-fi sharing need not be impeded: each user will be held re-
sponsible for his or her own actions and no more.  But insofar as tech-
nologically guaranteed anonymity is retained, more drastic means to 
eliminate individual wrongdoing through gatekeeper intervention wait 
in the wings. 
2.  Establishing a Choice Between Generativity and Responsibility. 
— To the extent that those who use generative platforms to invade le-
gally protected interests can be held directly liable, maintainers of 
technology platforms — ISPs and newly service-like OS makers — 
should be encouraged to keep their platforms generative, rather than 
narrowing their offerings to facilitate regulatory control as Professor 
Picker suggests.225 
In turn, the more service-oriented and less generative the platform, 
the more legal responsibility we should impose on the technology pro-
vider to guarantee a functioning system.  If a TiVo unit were not to 
operate as promised — suppose it simply crashed and failed to record 
any television programs — the law of warranty would quickly come 
into play.  If the TiVo unit were new enough, the company would 
make good on a repair or replacement.  Yet this simple exchange 
rarely takes place after the purchase of a new computer.  Suppose a 
new PC stops functioning: after a week of using it to surf the Internet 
and write articles, the consumer turns it on and sees only a blue error 
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screen.226  Unless smoke pours out of the PC to indicate a genuine 
hardware problem, the hardware manufacturer is likely to diagnose 
the problem as software-related.  Because the user installed software 
after purchasing the machine, pinpointing the problem is not easy, and 
in particularly difficult cases, the OS maker will simply suggest a labo-
rious and complete reinstallation of the OS, wiping clean all the 
changes that the consumer has made. 
Hardware and OS makers are right that they ought to bear very 
little responsibility for this all-too-common problem because it is not 
clear that either the hardware or the OS is at fault.  The mishmash of 
software found on even a two-week-old Internet-exposed PC thus pre-
cludes any obvious responsibility of a particular hardware or software 
manufacturer when problems arise. 
Part IV argues that TiVo and the PC are converging.  To the extent 
that PC OSs seek to screen what programs can run on them, the law 
should hold OS makers responsible for problems that arise just as 
TiVo and cellular phone manufacturers take responsibility for issues 
that arise with their controlled technologies.  If the OS remains open to 
new applications by third parties, the maker’s responsibility should be 
duly lessened.  Such a regime permits technology vendors to produce 
closed platforms but encourages them to produce generative platforms 
by scaling liabilities accordingly.  This tracks the intuition behind sec-
ondary theories of liability: technology makers may shape their tech-
nologies largely as they please, but the configurations they choose then 
inform their duties and liabilities. 
This Part sketches a modest route by which the operation of law 
might appropriately further generativity.  There are no doubt others, 
such as shaping consumer protection law to ensure that a shift from 
product to service does not permit a technology vendor to upset settled 
consumer expectations through a supposedly routine automatic prod-
uct update that in fact substantially changes the benefit of the con-
sumer’s bargain.  Each of these kinds of interventions is grounded in 
recognition that the law already influences the development of tech-
nology in manifold ways and thus can be adjusted to take generativity 
into account as an important end among other policy priorities. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The modern Internet is at a point of inflection.  This Article argues 
that its generativity, and that of the PC, has produced extraordinary 
progress in information technology, which in turn has led to extraordi-
nary progress in the development of forms of artistic and political ex-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  226  See Wikipedia, Blue Screen of Death, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_screen_of_death 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2006). 2040  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 119:1974  
pression.  Internet architects and regulatory authorities have ap-
plauded this progress, but they are increasingly concerned by its ex-
cesses.  The experimentalist spirit that fostered maximum generativity 
is out of place now that we rely upon the Internet and PCs for applica-
tions that we deem vital. 
The challenge facing those interested in a vibrant global Internet is 
to maintain the core of that experimentalist spirit in the face of grow-
ing pressures.  One path leads to a velvet divorce, creating two sepa-
rate Internets with distinct audiences: a return to the quiet backwater 
for the original experimentalist Internet that would restart the genera-
tive cycle among researchers and hackers distinct from consumers who 
live with a new, controlled Internet experience.  Two Internets would 
consign the existing grid to an appliancized fate, in which little new 
happens as existing technology players incrementally modify existing 
applications without the competitive pressure of grid-enabled innova-
tion arbitrage. 
The alternative paths that this Article advocates try to maintain 
the fundamental generativity of the existing grid while taking seriously 
the problems that fuel enemies of the Internet free-for-all.  It requires 
charting an intermediate course to make the grid more secure — and 
to make some activities to which regulators object more regulable — 
in order to continue to enable the rapid deployment of the sort of ama-
teur programming that has made the Internet such a stunning success. 
Crippling generative accessibility and adaptability by transforming 
the PC into an information appliance is undesirable.  So, too, are ham-
fisted clamps by ISPs upon network traffic in an effort to beat back 
viruses and other PC security threats, even as complete fidelity to end-
to-end neutrality may on balance harm the generative information 
technology environment.  Some limits are inevitable, and this Article 
attempts to point to ways in which these limits might be most judi-
ciously applied.  The key is to set such limits through thoughtful ad-
justments to accessibility that do not themselves spawn new central-
ized gatekeepers.  The right interventions will preserve the public’s 
ability to adopt new technologies from all corners, creating rough ac-
countability for those who wish to introduce software to the world and 
for individuals who put that software to certain uses, while enabling 
those who maintain generative technologies — the Internet architects, 
ISPs, and OS publishers — to keep those technologies open and to en-
sure that those who wish to contribute to the global information grid 
can do so without having to occupy the privileged perches of estab-
lished firms or powerful governments. 